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THE LIBERAL FORCES DRIVING THE SUPREME COURT'S
DIVESTMENT AND DEBASEMENT OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Ann Tweedy*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the Supreme Court's substantial
abandonment of a territorially based conception of Indian tribal
sovereignty in favor of a consent-based conception and its recent
characterization of tribal sovereignty as a special right, which may
be claimed only by weak and dependent tribes. It ultimately
attributes these trends, in significant part, to the Supreme Court's
increasing preoccupation with liberal goals in the decades
following the Civil Rights Movement. The Supreme Court's use
of liberalism to erode well-established Indian law doctrines
suggests that the continued application of liberal ideals poses
serious problems for multicultural societies like the United States.
These problems include the abolition of Indian tribes' special
status under the law and, more broadly, a threat to all subordinated
groups of involuntary assimilation into the majority white culture.
In part II, I analyze in chronological order several Supreme
Court cases, decided within the last two decades that have made
significant encroachments upon tribal sovereignty. This part
demonstrates the prevalence of the two previously identified trends
in the Supreme Court's recent Indian law jurisprudence: firstly,
the move toward a conception of sovereignty which is entirely
consent-based (i.e., the divestment of tribal sovereignty), and
secondly, the view of tribal sovereignty as a special right
belonging only to unsophisticated and economically disadvantaged
tribes (i.e., the debasement of tribal sovereignty). The purposes of
this part are threefold: 1) to demonstrate the degree to which the
Supreme Court has, in recent years, shrunk the breadth of Indian
J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), 1999.
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tribal sovereignty-largely on its own initiative, 2) to demonstrate
the vast shift in the Supreme Court's view of the justification for
tribal sovereignty, and 3) to identify the implicit liberal bases of
many of these decisions.
Part III focuses more narrowly on two of the suspect
methods the Supreme Court has used in recent cases to shrink and
degrade tribal sovereignty: 1) ignoring or diminishing the force of
the canons of construction in Indian law in order to reach a result
unfavorable to Indian tribes, and 2) construing the legislative intent
of acts of Congress without reference to subsequent legislative
history, such as amendment or outright repudiation, in order to
reach a result which disfavors Indian tribes and substantially
erodes their sovereignty. This part demonstrates the lengths to
which the Supreme Court has gone in pursuing its own
assimilationist agenda in Indian law-which has come at a
tremendous cost to settled expectations and tribal sovereignty.
In part IV, I discuss the Supreme Court's use of social
contract theory as an implicit basis of its decisions, especially
those that evince a consent-based view of tribal sovereignty.
Based on Rawls' version of social contract theory and Kymlicka's
criticisms of Rawls, I argue that social contract theory does not
adequately provide for the continuing viability of culturally distinct
groups-especially those with their own claims to sovereignty.
Additionally, I suggest that social contract theory is misapplied by
the Court; that mainstream American society is unjust under
Rawls' standards; that it makes no sense to force Indian tribes to
create a just society according to social contract standards; and
lastly, that the Supreme Court's view of Indian tribal governments
as non-neutral or biased is based not on any substantive criticism
of tribes derived from social contract theory, but rather on the
racist idea that whiteness connotes neutrality whereas Indianness
or color connotes bias or special interest.
In part V, I argue that the Supreme Court is motivated to
dismantle Indian sovereignty because of its increasingly liberal
view that such sovereignty is a special, race-based right, which,
through its very focus on race, violates liberal equality theory. I
argue that this effect is indicative of the severe problems liberal
equality theory poses for recognized Indian tribes, as well as for
subordinated groups generally, and that the Supreme Court's
The Liberal Forces
degraded view of tribal sovereignty contrasts sharply with its view
of state sovereignty as a necessary attribute of power. I conclude
that liberalism must be drastically modified or abandoned in order
to preserve the uniqueness of subordinated cultures in general and
the sovereignty of Indian tribes in particular.
II. THE ACTIVIST COURT'S DIVESTMENT AND DEBASEMENT
OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Gradual Divestment of Tribal Sovereignty:
Moving from a Territorially-Based to a Consent-Based
Conception
Territorially-based sovereignty means that an Indian tribe's
sovereignty is coextensive with its territory (usually an Indian
reservation). Thus, it extends to all those who are present within
reservation boundaries, whether or not they are members or
nonmembers of the tribe, as well as to the land itself. Consent-
based sovereignty means that the tribe may only exercise authority
over its members and to some extent their land because, by
agreeing to become tribal members and by remaining so, the
members have consented to the tribe's authority.! Thus, the only
basis for sovereignty under a wholly consent-based view is the
revocable agreement of individual members to be bound by the
tribe's authority.2
As will be shown, the reservation boundaries become much less important
under a consent-based view due to the fact that many non-Indians now own land
within the reservation. Under a consent-based view, tribal sovereignty does not
extend to these non-Indian owned lands, whereas, under a territorially-based
view, tribal sovereignty would extend to all land within reservation boundaries.
The view of sovereignty espoused by the current Court remains a hybrid of the
consent- and territorially-based views, although, as I will show, the Court has
been steadily moving closer to an entirely consent-based view over
approximately the past.
2
See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 809 (1996); Allison M. Dussias,
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITr. L. REv. 1
(1993).
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Viewed chronologically, the Supreme Court's Indian law
decisions began with a territorially-based conception of
sovereignty in Worcester v. Georgia3 and have moved to a
predominantly consent-based conception of sovereigntY4 that is
exemplified by cases such as Duro v. Reina5 and Strate v. A-1
Contractors.
6
This movement, however, was not inevitable. In several of
the cases decided since Worcester, the Supreme Court has retained
significant aspects of territorially-based sovereignty in its overall
conception of sovereignt. 7 However, beginning with Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself
broad power in determining the scope of tribal sovereignty, which
used to belong solely to Congress. 9 The Supreme Court has also
abrogated the presumption in favor of tribal sovereignty that used
to control in the absence of Congressional action to the contrary.'
0
The result has been that the Supreme Court-which has become
3
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
4
See generally Gould, supra note 3; see also Dussias, supra note 3. As this
paper will show, territorially-based sovereignty has been rejected even more
firmly in the Court's most recent decisions, which were issued after the above
articles were published.
5
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
6
Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, _ U.S. _ (1997).7
See, e.g., Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)
(holding that there is a presumption in favor of the tribal court's jurisdiction
when a tribal member sues a nonmember and the suit arose within reservation
boundaries); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (holding
that the tribe had sovereign power to impose a severance tax on a nontribal
business that was mining the tribe's land); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544 (1975) (holding that Congress could delegate the authority to regulate on-
reservation liquor licensing to the tribe, in part because the tribe could exercise
sovereign powers of its own); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding
that a nonmember of tribe must sue a member in tribal court, rather than state
court, when the suit arose on the reservation).
8
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
9
See Gould, supra note 3, at 848.
10
See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of
Tribal Courts over Nonmember Indians: An Examination of the Basic
Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38
FED. B. NEWS & J. 70, 71 (1991).
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increasingly hostile to Indian sovereignty in the years following
Oliphant-has increasingly encroached upon Indian sovereignty,
pursuant to its own self-accorded powers.
1. The Beginning of the End: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court decided that the tribe had
no jurisdiction to try non-Indians for criminal offenses committed
on the reservation. The decision was based four separate factors:
1) the fact that treaties with Indians typically did not mention the
power-and in one case proscribed it; 2) "unspoken"
Congressional assumptions that such jurisdiction did not exist;" 3)
the silence of the federal government's treaty with the Suquamish
Tribe as to the reach of the tribe's criminal jurisdiction; and 4) the
perceived inconsistency of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians with the tribe's dependent status.1
2
The Court's decision flew in the face of established Indian
law doctrine, which previous to Oliphant, mandated that "' [w]hat
is not expressly limited [by Congressional action or treaty] remains
within the domain of tribal sovereignty."" 13 Moreover, the Court's
decision relied on dubious evidence including unenacted bills,
district court decisions, and assumptions of Congress and other
branches of government. 14 Other irregularities include the fact that
one of the administrative opinions the Court relied upon had been
withdrawn with no explanation-as the Court itself admitted,15 the
fact that the drafters of the Suquamish Tribe's treaty had rejected
11 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 (referring to Congress' "unspoken assumption"
as to the lack of criminal jurisdiction).
12
Id. at 196-211.
13 Deloria and Newton, supra note 11, at 71 (quoting FELIX COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942)). See also Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 453
(1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that Oliphant marked
the only instance since the Cherokee Cases, decided in the 1820s and 1830s, in
which the Court had found aspects of tribal sovereignty to be divested by virtue
of the tribes' dependence on the federal government).
14
See Deloria and Newton, supra note 11, at 71.
15
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 n.11.
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language granting the federal government power to criminally try
white offenders (which tends to suggest that the tribe was to retain
this power_,16 and the Court's exaggeration of the force of its own
precedent. 7
In addition to the suspect bases of its decision, the Court
also appeared to be relying on social contract theory to find that the
tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. On the first
page of the decision, the Court points out that only 37% of the land
on the reservation was Indian-owned and that only fifty tribal
members resided there compared to almost 3,000 non-Indians.
18
Soon after, the Court notes that, while the tribal courts are bound
16 See Dussias, supra note 3, at 27; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 207 n.17.
17 In justifying its decision to ignore the canons of construction, which
mandate that all treaty and statutory ambiguities (in cases where the statutes
were enacted for the benefit of the Indians) be resolved in favor of the Indians,
the Court cited DeCoteau v. District County Court as lending support to the
proposition that "treaty... provisions which are not clear on their face may 'be
clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history."' Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 207 n.17 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
444 (1975)). This is a somewhat dishonest interpretation of DeCoteau, in which
the Court found itself constrained to rule that the tribe had been terminated
based on "the face of the Acf' in question, as well as on the bases of the
"surrounding circumstances" and "legislative history," all of which pointed
squarely toward termination. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444 (citations omitted).
See also Part III A., supra.
Moreover, in the primary case cited by the DeCoteau Court for the
proposition that legislative history and surrounding circumstances may be taken
into account in determining Congressional intent, the Court used the auxiliary
factors of legislative history and surrounding circumstances to find in favor of
the tribe in spite of the face of the Act itself, which tended to indicate
Congressional intent to terminate the reservation. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481, 504 (1973). It perverts the holdings of DeCoteau and Mattz to use them to
interpret the silence in the Suquamish Tribe's treaty as to criminal jurisdiction,
coupled with vague or irrelevant treaty and statutory provisions, as basis's for
finding that the tribe lacked jurisdiction. Cf United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313 (1978) (relying on the presumption in favor of tribal sovereignty to uphold
concurrent criminal jurisdiction of tribes and the federal government over tribal
members and also finding no double jeopardy violation where both sovereigns
tried the criminal defendant).18 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 192 n.1.
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by most rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, non-Indians have
no right to serve on Suquamish tribal court juries.19
The fact that Indians comprise a majority on the reservation
should be irrelevant to whether the tribe's inherent sovereignty has
been divested in the area of criminal jurisdiction. However, the
Court appears to be viewing the low ratio of Indians to non-Indians
on the reservation as evidence that it would be inherently unfair to
allow Indians, a small minority on the reservation, to rule whites
and other non-Indians, who represent the majority. Implicit in this
conclusion of unfairness is the social contract idea that government
is only justified in asserting authority if those subject to the
authority would consent to it or would have consented to it in a
theoretical state of nature.20  Here the Court has apparently
concluded that no racial majority would consent to be ruled by a
racial minority, especially where members of the racial majority
are excluded from jury service. Not only should the Supreme
Court's own policy considerations have little bearing in an area of
law under the plenary control of Congress,2 1 but, as will be
discussed in more detail later, the Court is enforcing an idea of
justice on Indian tribes that the United States and individual state
governments do not abide by themselves. Moreover, a person's
very presence on an Indian reservation is a form of consent,22 and
presumably even property values on the reservation reflect non-
Indians' views of the value of living there as opposed to
somewhere where the rules and customs are more familiar. In
summary, in the absence of any clear Congressional intent to
disallow tribal criminal jurisdiction, the Court should have viewed
19
Id. at 193-94.
20 See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Another reason
the Court's implicit application of social contract theory to Indian tribes is
dubious is that tribes are not technically part of the United States' governmental
structure-as are states. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1 (1831) (holding that tribes are "domestic dependent nations"). Thus, the
Court's authority to interfere in their internal governmental affairs-which,
contrary to the Court's view, sometimes involve nonmembers-seems
Tuestionable.
See Dussias, supra note 3, at 87 (noting that "one consents to criminal
jurisdiction by presence in the jurisdiction").
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itself as constrained to find in favor of the tribe on the issue of
criminal jurisdiction. Instead, by delegating to itself the duty to
constrict tribal sovereignty in the absence of Congressional action
affirming it, the Court usurped tribal authority and Congress' role
as the primary architect of federal and tribal relations. The
decision paved the way for the Court's own unprecedented
divestment of tribal sovereignty.
2. Expanding the Oliphant Presumption of Divestment of
Tribal Sovereignty to Civil Regulation of Nonmembers:
Montana v. United States
In Montana v. United States,23 the Supreme Court held: (1)
that the United States had not conveyed the bed of the Big Horn
River to the Crow Indian Tribe when it conveyed the land
comprising the reservation, and (2) that tribal regulatory authority
over nonmembers on fee-owned land within the reservation is
implicitly divested except in cases where (a) the nonmember has
entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe, or (b) the
nonmember's activity has or threatens to have a "direct effect on
the political integrit, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.", 4 At issue in Montana was the Crow Indian
Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers
on land within the reservation that nonmembers owned in fee. The
Court found that the tribe had no such regulatory authority.
As two commentators have suggested, the Court set itself
up to arrive at the first part of its holding by erroneously framing
the issue. 2 5  Instead of viewing the treaty as documenting the
tribe's reservation or retention of existing rights in accordance with
traditional practice, the Court viewed the treaty as a land grant by
the United States, thus enabling it to hold that the language of the
grant was not sufficiently clear to warrant a finding that the United
23




See Russell Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, Contrary
Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After
Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REv. 627, 675 (1981).
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States had conveyed the river bed to the tribe.26 Instead, the Court
should have seen that this ambiguity precluded a finding that the
tribe had conveyed the riverbed to the United States. As in
Oliphant, there is also evidence that the Court misconstrued
precedent in arriving at the first prong of its holding in Montana.
27
In the second part of its holding, the Court cited Oliphant
for "the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe. 28  Having underhandedly erased tribal sovereignty over a
broad range of reservation activity not considered in Oliphant, the
Court was then able to appear generous in stating exceptions to its
newfound "general proposition." As others have pointed out, one
effect of the above novel formulation was to shift the burden from
the state to the tribe of showing the extent of tribal sovereignty.
29
Not surprisingly, the Court subsequently concluded that the
non-Indians living on the reservation "do not enter any agreements
or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to subject themselves to
tribal civil jurisdiction, [a]nd nothing in this case suggests that
such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's
political or economic security so as to justify tribal regulation." 30
The fact that the Crow Indians were originally buffalo hunters, not
fishermen, and that the tribe did not allege that its subsistence was
imperiled by the non-Indian hunting and fishing appeared to be
integral to the Court's decision.
3 1
The Montana Court's focus on whether the nonmembers
had entered into any consensual relationship with the tribe is itself
26
Id.
27 Barsh and Henderson point out that the Montana Court erroneously relied
on a factually distinguishable case in finding that the United States had not
conveyed the river bed in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
See Barsh and Henderson, supra note 26, at 677 (stating that, "[a]pplied in the
Crow context, Holt should mean simply that, should the Crows ever cede their
reservation, full title to the riverbed would vest automatically in the State of
Montana").
28
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
29 See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to
Divest Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 1281, 1285 (1995).
30
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
31 Id. at 556, 566.
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a direct invocation of social contract theory and liberal ideals
generally. Apparently, the Court assumes that a tribal government
is not the type of unbiased, neutral institution to which people can
be presumed to have consented (such as state and national
governments), and that the only way non-Indians may be bound is
if they make some sort of formal gesture of consent-such as
entering into a contract with the tribe. This requirement stands in
staik contrast to the mainstream view of state and federal
jurisdiction under which citizens and noncitizens alike are
irrebuttably presumed to have consented by virtue of the supposed
fairness of the system.32  The Montana Court's opinion also
invokes liberal ideals in more subtle ways. For example, while the
Court did not fully repeat the social contract language it employed
in Oliphant-perhaps because the ratios were not as striking-it
did indicate that 28% of land within the boundaries of the Crow
Indian reservation is owned in fee by non-Indians. 33 It also noted
that the State of Montana stocks the river with fish.34 Again both
facts are irrelevant to the divestment of tribal sovereignty. Even if
28% of the property owners in the State of Florida were non-
resident vacationers, it would be hard to imagine the Court holding
that the State lacked regulatory authority over those property
owners and that only the vacationers' home states could regulate
the Florida land.35 Moreover, the State of Montana could not
divest tribal sovereignty by stocking the river with fish; this fact
merely shows that Montana was either being generous or thought it
32 See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 3, at 87.
33
Montana, 450 U.S. at 548.
34 Id.
35 This comparison between states and tribes is not meant to imply that the
two types of entities are equivalent to each other. Instead, it is employed to
show that both are considered "quasi-sovereigns." See Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (describing tribes as quasi-sovereigns); Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that state courts must enforce federal claims in most
cases and thus suggesting that state sovereignty is less complete than federal
sovereignty). States are often treated much more favorably by the Court and
receive a much greater degree of respect from it. Thus, my point is not that
states and tribes should always be treated the same by the federal government,
but rather that tribes should not be treated any less favorably than states without
some reasoned justification.
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owned the riverbed. Either way, the State remained at all times
free to stock or not stock the river as it chose.
The Court seems to be stating these facts to implicitly
invoke liberal ideas of fairness rather than to further any
substantive Indian law discussion. After all, if the state of
Montana bought the fish, why shouldn't Montanans be able to
catch the fish? Also, why should a significant percentage of the
reservation residents be subject to an alien regulatory authority-
i.e., Indian-which they have not consented to, and which rational
beings would never willingly consent to? These are knee-jerk
reactions by the Court rather than compelling reasons to destroy
tribal sovereignty.
In conclusion, Montana is most important for its extension
of the Oliphant holding that tribal sovereignty is implicitly
divested in criminal cases involving non-Indians to the regulatory
arena. Its focus on nonmember consent to tribal jurisdiction3 6 and
its recitation of irrelevant facts clearly demonstrates that the
Supreme Court is using liberal notions of fairness and social
contract theory as implicit rationales for its increasing
encroachment on tribal sovereignty.
3. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe: An Ominous Dissent
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,37 the Court actually
affirmed the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's sovereign power to tax oil
and gas extracted by nonmember lessees pursuant to contracts with
the tribe. The Court did not mention Montana, holding simply that
the power to tax is "an essential aspect of Indian sovereignty
because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and
36 The terms "nonmember" and "non-Indian" were conflated by the Court
until Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). In Duro, the Court held that Indian
nonmembers had to be treated similarly to non-Indian nonmembers; thus, after
Duro, the decisive distinction in determining the reach of tribal sovereignty,
under the Court's view, has been between nonmembers of the tribe (both Indian
and non-Indian) and tribal members. However, Congress overrode Duro by
statute, although the constitutionality of the statutory provision has yet to be
tested by the Supreme Court. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301(4) (West 1998).37 Merrion v. Jicarilla, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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territorial management." 38 In the absence of "'clear indications'
that Congress has implicitly deprived the Tribe of its power to
impose the severance tax," the tribe retained the power to tax.39 As
the opinion does not divest tribal sovereignty, it is interesting for
the purposes of this article only for Justice Stevens' dissent, which
is heavily infected with liberal ideals.
40
In Stevens view, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers
derives solely from the tribe's power to exclude them from the
reservation.41  Under this interpretation, because the tribe had
entered into contracts with the lessees (by which the tribe
effectively forfeited its right to exclude the lessees for the duration
of the leases), prior to enacting the tax, the tax was invalid as
applied to the lessees.42 In tying the sovereign power to tax to the
power to exclude, Stevens explicitly relied on the liberal notion of
government by the consent of the governed: "[tihe tribe's
authority to enact legislation affecting nonmembers is ...of a
different character than their broad power to control internal tribal
affairs. This difference is consistent with the fundamental
principle that '[in] this Nation each sovereign governs only with
the consent of the governed. ' 43 Moreover, Stevens asserted that,






The Stevens dissent is also notable for its revisionist view of tribal
sovereignty: "[i]n sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their own
members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always been narrowly
confined." Merrion, 455 U.S. at 171 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Stevens
cites three treaties in a footnote to support this proposition, directly after making
the statement he launches into a discussion of Oliphant and Montana, thus
suggesting that those cases merely applied a well-established rule of law rather
than a novel doctrine. See id. Moreover, it is doubtful that three specific treaties
merely imposing limits on the jurisdiction of the tribes that were parties to the
treaties could be read to support Stevens' proposition that tribes always were
severely limited in their jurisdiction over nonmembers. See id. at 171, n.21.41 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).42
Id.
43
Id. (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)).
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government, "the powers that may be exercised over them are
appropriately limited."44
While these statements have intrinsic appeal to minds
trained in the liberal tradition,45 Stevens' practical application of
the principle of government by consent is actually quite novel.46
African-Americans, for example, could not vote in the United
States until 1870, and had problems effectively asserting the right
well into the 1960s. 47  Yet no one seriously argued that their
unconstitutional exclusion from the governmental process rendered
them exempt from state or federal criminal laws. Similarly
women, while historically excluded from juries and officially
disenfranchised until 1920,48 remained subject to state and federal
criminal laws throughout their overt subordination. Finally, and
most Xertinently, Indians were made United States citizens in
1924," although they had been subject to the federal Major Crimes
Act since 1885.50 While one might question the justice of these
policies, they do render suspect Stevens' attempt to impose more
stringent policies upon Indian tribes in the name of justice and the
American way. In short, categorical exclusion from governmental
processes, while sometimes considered a wrong in itself, has never
been construed to wholly divest the sovereign of power over the
entire excluded group in the United States.
5 1
44
Id. The majority properly points out the error in this view of tribal
sovereignty, noting that consent "has little if any role in measuring the validity
of an exercise of legitimate sovereign authority." See id. at 147.
45 See Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred
Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26
ARIz. ST. L.J. 495, 513 (1994).
46
Cf Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-
Colonialism and the Supreme Court's New Indian Law Agenda, 38 FED. B.
NEws & J. 92, 99 (March 1991) (making a similar argument with respect to
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
47
See MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN
SERIOUSLY 907 (1994).
48
Id. at 13, 26.
49 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. at 692.50 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
51 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
participation in the political process has never been held to be a "prerequisite to
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Stevens' application of the consent-of-the-governed notion
to tribes, which are considered domestic dependent nations, is
equally novel. For example, if a United States citizen went to
France and committed a crime, she would be automatically subject
to the jurisdiction of France (although it is possible that a United
States official could use his or her political clout to persuade
France to relinquish its jurisdiction). It is doubtful, however, that a
member of the U.S. federal government would presume to tell
France that it lacked jurisdiction over the U.S. citizen based on
some perceived injustice in the French system. Indeed, such an
assertion would probably be considered exceedingly disrespectful,
although the Supreme Court persistently divests Indian tribes of
jurisdiction in this manner. Stevens' dissent in Merrion heralded
in a new era in which liberal ideals (which arguably have no place
in the special rights arena of Indian law) would be used as explicit
tools to thwart Indian attempts at self-determination that remain in
accordance with Congress' articulated Indian law policies.
52
4. Further Narrowing Montana and Finding Tribal Zoning
Authority to Fit within the Second Montana Exception only
in Special Circumstances: Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation
In a confusing array of plurality opinions, the Supreme
Court, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation,53 held that the Yakima Tribe retained
sovereign power to zone nonmember lands in one part of its
reservation, which had not been significantly developed-an
overwhelming majority of which was held in trust for the tribe
(i.e., "the closed area"), whereas it lacked authority to zone
nonmember lands in another section of its reservation, only a little
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a sovereign," for such a holding would
preclude state prosecutions of nonresidents and federal prosecution of aliens).
See Barsh and Henderson, supra note 26, at 685 (recognizing that
Congress' official policy towards Indian tribes is one of self-determination).53
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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more than one half of which was held in trust for the tribe (i.e.,
"the open area").54
a. Complete Divestment of Tribal Sovereignty in
Cases Relating to Nonmembers: The White
Plurality Opinion
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, delivered one plurality opinion in
which he agreed that the tribe lacked authority to zone the open
area but disagreed that it retained authority to zone the closed area.
Arguing that "[a] tribe's inherent sovereignty.., is divested to the
extent that it is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, that
is, to the extent it involves a tribe's 'external relations,"'55 the
White plurality contended that the tribe had lost jurisdiction to
zone the land when it alienated the land to nonmembers. 6 Under
the White plurality's view, the second Montana exception 57 could
only be applied on a case-by-case basis58 and should be treated as
discretionary (i.e., the tribe would not have the federal right to
have enjoined all conduct which would have a direct effect on its
survival, but would only be granted enjoinment by a federal court
in certain "demonstrably serious" circumstances in which it faced
such a threat). 59
54 Id.55 Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). See also Justice Blackmun's concurring
and dissenting opinion in Brendale, arguing that the Wheeler dicta is taken out
of context here and misconstrued. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 452, n.3 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The White plurality also recited the familiar litany
of facts as to the extent of non-Indian ownership on the reservation. Id. at 415.
56 Id. at 422.
57 Under this exception, a tribe has sovereign authority to regulate
nonmembers' conduct when that conduct threatens or has a direct effect on the
tribe's health and welfare, political integrity, or economic security. See
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
58
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431.59 Id. at 428-29 (reaching this result by focusing on the word "may," which
proceeds the Court's articulation of the second exception in Montana).
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Under this view, the tribe was required to assert its interests
under the second Montana exception at the county's zoning
hearings, which were to decide whether the proposed
developments on the reservation were legal under the county's
zoning laws. After the conclusion of the hearings, if the proposed
development was found to be legal, the tribe could argue to the
district court that this particular use of the land would threaten to
have or would have some direct effect in one of the specified areas;
the district court could then decide how severe the direct effect
would be, whether circumstances warranted federal protection, and
accordingly enjoin or not enjoin the proposed development at its
discretion.
60
The White plurality's interpretation serves to further
narrow Montana by reading it to hold that a tribe's sovereignty is
always divested as to nonmembers but that a tribe may invoke
federal protection (rather than asserting its own sovereign
authority) when nonmembers' conduct seriously imperils its
survival.61 Presumably, a federal court would have to engage in
some sort of balancing test to determine whether the circumstances
warrant protecting the tribe in that particular case. How serious the
conduct must be remains a mystery, but it is clear that it must rise
to a very high level of egregiousness.62 The White plurality thus
saw Montana as completely divesting tribal sovereignty as to
nonmembers. Only if the conduct rose to an extraordinary level-
sufficient to invoke the second Montana exception-could the
tribe argue for its protection from nonmember conduct under
federal law.6
3
This is a striking reading of Montana, which actually held






Presumably, the tribe would also have to be sufficiently cohesive so that the
nonmember conduct at issue-and not other forces-threatened the health and
welfare, political integrity or economic security of the tribe. If it were in dire
straits, one can imagine this plurality stating that enjoining the conduct at issue
would make little difference. The plurality would probably view this as an
opportunity to step back and allow assimilation to occur.63
See Clinton, supra note 47, at 99.
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divested except in certain circumstances-such as when it is
threatened in specified ways.64 In addition, the factual context of
Montana makes clear that the Court was concerned with certain
categories of regulatory authority, such as hunting and fishing on
nonmember fee land. The idea that, even if the category of
conduct threatened or had a direct effect in one of the specified
areas, the tribe would only be able to invoke federal assistance to
curb hunting and fishing in specific, egregious circumstances (e.g.,
to enjoin the killing of a particular fish) reveals the absurdity of
Justice White's reasoning in Brendale. Justice White and the
justices that joined his plurality were on the Court when Montana
was decided and presumably understood the case. Their conscious
or unconscious misconstrual of the case indicates their personal
bias shrinking tribal sovereignty at any cost.
b. The Stevens Plurality: The Power to Control the
Land's Character as Determinative of Tribal Zoning
Authority
Justice Stevens, joined by O'Connor, based his finding in
favor of the tribe as to the closed area of the reservation on the
facts that: only a small portion of the area was owned in fee
(25,000 acres out of 807,000), access to the area was very
restricted, and the area contained "natural foods, medicines, and
other natural resources" which were important to the tribe.65 To
Stevens, these facts indicated that the tribe had maintained "the
power to exclude nonmembers from all but a small portion of the
closed area .. .[and thereby] preserved the power to define the
essential character of that area."6 6 Furthermore, he compared the
tribe's power to zone to an equitable servitude.
67
64
See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 456 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
See also Gould, supra note 3, at 878 (noting that "[b]y eliminating a tribe's
direct authority to regulate nonmembers, Justice White effectively dispensed
with the [second Montana] exception").
65
Brendale, 492 U.S. 439 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
66
Id at 441. Although Stevens does not explicitly say so, the last fact appears
to suggest that the Tribe's zoning authority (as to the closed area) is preserved
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As to the open area, Justice Stevens stated that the tribe had
lost the power to zone this portion because a large portion of the
land (almost half) was owned in fee (a result of the assimilationist
Dawes Act) and because nonmembers leased additional land in the
open area.p8 These facts indicated that the tribe had lost the power
to exclude substantial numbers of nonmembers from the open area
and that it had therefore lost the capacity to determine the essential
character of the land in the open area.69 Justice Stevens also
mentioned the seemingly extraneous facts that only members of
the tribe could participate in tribal elections, whereas both Indians
and non-Indians could participate in county elections, and that only
tribal members tended to take advantage of tribal services. 70 By
reciting these facts, Stevens again invoked liberal notions of
fairness and social contract theory as bases for his decision.
Notably, Stevens' notion of the power to exclude has a
strong liberal basis-i.e., the liberal notion of individual property
rights. In his interpretation, Indian tribes are like large landowners
or even a condominium association that makes restrictive
covenants on its land.71 The point of Indian sovereignty, however,
is to allow tribes the right to self-determination-i.e., the right to
practice their indigenous cultures and live according to their mores.
Because Western European ideas of personal land ownership are
notoriously foreign to most Indian tribes, it is ironic for the
Supreme Court to limit tribal sovereignty to a sort of
individualized Western property right aggregated in a group. Such
a conception is inconsistent with self-determination, which would
allow Indian tribes to utilize their own conceptions of property and
government on the reservation. While, under a traditional view of
sovereignty, the Indians would retain authority to regulate both the
open and closed areas unless Congress had specifically divested
under the second Montana exception. The last fact also suggests that the Tribe









71 Id. at 442 (noting that Indian sovereignty over reservation land in the closed
area is tantamount to an equitable servitude).
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them of the authority, under Stevens' view, facts such as how
many non-Indians are present on the reservation and whether they
can participate in the tribal government may be weighed against a
finding of tribal sovereignty in an implicit formula. This formula
is invoked whenever liberal ideals make the Court uncomfortable
with a particular assertion of Indian tribal sovereignty.
Conversely, Justice Blackmun's plurality, which argued in
favor of tribal zoning authority over the entire reservation, simply
pointed out the extent to which the other two pluralities
misconstrued Indian law precedents and wrongly relied upon a
consent-based rather than geographical view of tribal
sovereignty.72 It has no binding effect and is not pertinent to the
discussion here.
5. Reifying Consent as a Prerequisite to the Exercise of Tribal
Sovereignty: Duro v. Reina
In Duro v. Reina,73 the Supreme Court extended its holding
in Oliphant to apply to nonmember Indians as well as to non-
Indians. The Court went into great detail as to the unfairness of
allowing nonmember Indians, who had not consented to tribal
jurisdiction, to be criminally tried in tribal courts.74 At bottom, it
seemed driven to its conclusion by the racial inequities that would
apparently result if non-Indians were automatically exempt from
tribal criminal jurisdiction, even if they lived on the reservation,
whereas, Indians-whether members or not-remained
automatically subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction.75
At issue in Duro was the Tribe's authority to criminally try
a nonmember Indian, who lived and worked on the reservation, for
the illegal discharge of a firearm that resulted in the death of a
72
Id. at 448-68.73 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
74
See Gould, supra note 3, at 851.75 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-95. See also Deloria and Newton, supra note 11,
at 72 (describing "the Court's recent fixation on racial classifications in Indian
law" as a "disturbing trend").
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fourteen-year-old boy.76  Although Duro had originally been
charged in federal court with murder and aiding and abetting
murder, the indictment was dismissed on a motion by the U.S.
Attorney.77  The Supreme Court displayed uncharacteristic
sympathy for a criminal defendant in repeatedly noting that Duro
"is not eligible for membership in the Pima-Maricopa Tribe," nor
is he "entitled to vote in Pima-Maricopa elections, to hold tribal
office, or to serve on tribal juries."78 Additionally, the Court found
there was "no evidence that nonmembers have a say in tribal
affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements." 7  It then
held that the evident lack of consent to tribal jurisdiction inherent
in lack of tribal membership mandated a finding that Duro was not
subject to the tribe's jurisdiction. 80  As previously noted, such
consent-of-the-governed language is a clear invocation of social
contract theory.
Rather than acknowledging that it was encroaching upon
tribal sovereignty, the Court viewed itself as "reject[ing] an
extension of tribal sovereignty over those who have not given the
consent of the governed that provides a fundamental basis for
power within our constitutional system." 82 Thus, it reaffirmed the
Oliphant view that tribal powers not affirmatively recognized in
Congressional legislation are implicitly divested, and once again
portrayed itself as a conscientious adherent to precedent rather than
an activist court.
76
The reason the Tribe charged Duro with such a minor offense was that the
Indian Civil Rights Act limits the punishments a tribal court may impose to a
year in jail and fines up to $5,000. See Deloria and Newton, supra note 11, at
70.
77
Duro, 495 U.S. at 679-80.
78






See Part II.A. 1-3 supra.82 Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (citations omitted). Notably, this formulation
neglects the obvious reality, recognized elsewhere in the opinion, that tribal
governments are not bound by the U.S. Constitution and therefore should not be
bound by the notion of the consent of the governed. See id. at 693.
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Commentators have pointed out that the Duro opinion is
problematic because it effectively made reservations ungovernable
as a result of the large number of nonmember Indians that live on
most reservations and the fact that federal prosecutors do not take
much interest in crimes committed on reservations.83 Indeed, the
petitioner in Duro, an alleged murderer, avoided both trial and
punishment as a result of apparent federal apathy and the Court's
divestment of tribal jurisdiction over him. One need only imagine
the outcry that would ensue in a white suburb if a suspected child
murderer walked away without even a trial to see the racial
inequity in the situation created by Duro. The holding was swiftly
overridden by Congress, however, and the Court has not yet had
the opportunity to decide whether to strike down the new
legislation.
84
6. Extending Montana to Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction:
Strate v. A-1 Contractors
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,85 the Court extended Montana
to cover tribal court civil jurisdiction as well as tribal regulatory
authority stating that: "[a]s to nonmembers, we hold that a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction. ' 8 At issue in Strate was the tribal court's jurisdiction
over a nonmember's tort claim against a non-Indian subcontractor
that had been engaged by a tribal corporation to do landscaping
work. 7 The plaintiff had been married to a tribal member and
lived on the reservation. Furthermore, the tort arose on a highway




See Deloria and Newton, supra note 11, at 71-73.84
See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301(4) (West 1998). See also Gould, supra note 3, at
854 (suggesting that the new legislation may be unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause).
85
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404,_ U.S. _ (1997).86
Id. at 1413.
87 Id. at 1408.
88
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a. Weakening the Force of Precedent
In Strate, the Court weakened the force of two of its
previous opinions, which had held that a presumption in favor of
tribal jurisdiction inhered in the civil adjudicatory context and that
this presumption required federal courts not to intervene until
exhaustion of tribal court remedies had occurred. It held that
Montana applied to the civil adjudicatory context and
disingenuously declared the two prior cases to be entirely
consistent with Montana.8 9
On the contrary, the presumption in favor of tribal
jurisdiction mandated by National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of
Indians and Iowa Mutual Co. v. LaPlante would be an empty
gesture if Montana applied to such cases, making civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers (at least when the suit
arose on fee land in the reservation) the exception rather than the
rule. Moreover, the exhaustion of tribal remedies, which those
cases required, would be highly inefficient if, in a majority of
cases, it was expected that the federal courts would later find that
the tribes had lacked jurisdiction in the first place. Finally, the
National Farmers Union Court specifically rejected the
petitioner's contention that the Oliphant presumption of lack of
tribal sovereignty over criminal matters applied in the civil
adjudicatory context, even when the suit arose on land within
reservation boundaries owned in fee by the state.90 Given that
Montana itself extended the Oliphant presumption to the civil
regulatory context when nonmember fee land was at issue, the
Strate Court's averment that Montana and National Farmers
Union are wholly consistent is misleading at best.
89 Id. at 1413 (discussing National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845 (1985), and Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, 480
U.S. 9 (1987)).
90 National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 847, 854
(1985).
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b. Narrowing the Scope of the First Montana
Exception
After determining that Montana applied in. the civil
adjudicatory context when the suit arose on reservation land which
was not under tribal control, the Supreme Court proceeded to hold
that the case at bar fit into neither of the two Montana
exceptions. 91 Since the defendant, A-1 Contractors, had entered
into a consensual business relationship with the tribe, it would
seem that the first Montana exception clearly applied.92 Rather
than applying the exception according to its plain meaning,
however, the Court narrowed it considerably. After noting the
existence of the consensual relationship, the Court dismissed its
relevance, pointing out that the plaintiff was not a party to the
contract and that the tribe itself was not involved in the accident.
93
The Strate Court thus read the exception as allowing tribal
regulation adjudication (and presumably regulation) only as to
issues directly related to the consensual business relationship.
Under the Strate Court's reading then (at least where non-tribally
controlled land is at issue), the first exception apparently does
nothing more than subject the business entity to suits based on the
contract itself since it is hard to imagine that the Strate Court
would see the validity of any additional regulations imposed by the
tribe--even those touching on the contractual obligations-as
being sufficiently bound up with the consensual relationship to fall
91
Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1415-16. Note that both the Montana and Strate cases
arose within reservation boundaries but not on tribally controlled trust lands.
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 547; Sb-ate, 117 S. Ct. at 1407. Both decisions are
2properly limited to these circumstances.
The exception reads as follows: "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases or other arrangements." See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565
(citations omitted).
93
Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1415. How the tribe might be involved in an accident
is mysterious. Would all the members have to be on a bus that was struck by the
subcontractor?
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under the first Montana exception.94  Finally, the Court's
suggestion that the torts committed by the agents of a
subcontractor, on the reservation, have no nexus to the consensual
relationship is puzzling (i.e., why would the agent have been
present on the reservation if it were not for the consensual
relationship?). 95
The Court's reading of the first Montana exception is
distinctively liberal as it limits the scope of tribal authority only to
what the nonmember actually consented to. By entering into
business relationships with a tribe, such as the one at issue here,
the Court sees the nonmember as expressing only a very limited
consent to tribal government. The Court's reluctance to find a
broader consent may be due to its assumption that one who cannot
vote in tribal elections or serve on tribal juries can never provide
sufficient indicia of consent when tribal control is at issue. Again,
the Court imposes a more vigorous conception of Western justice
on tribes than it is willing to impose on our own national and state
governments. This is problematic because the Court has more
authority to impose its conception of justice internally, on the
federal and state governments, than it does to impose such a
conception on tribes, which never consented to be part of the
United States.
94
Moreover, if the exception is strictly limited by the scope of the actual
consensual relationship, it would seem that the issue of the validity of tribal
taxation (one of the activities enumerated as permissible in Montana) could be
viewed , after Strate, as beyond the civil adjudicatory power of the tribe.
Indeed, such an argument could theoretically be based on Stevens' argument
against tribal taxation power itself. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). However, it is important to emphasize Strate involved two
nonmember litigants, and it is properly limited to cases between nonmembers.
Although its language is broad, it does not technically call Merrion into
Wuestion.
One possible reason why the Strate Court has difficulty applying the first
Montana exception is that it was not meant to apply in the adjudicatory context
It only makes sense when applied to regulatory authority, which is always
exercised by the tribe, unlike civil adjudicatory authority, which is usually
exercised by individuals.
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c. Finding the Second Montana Exception Similarly
Inapplicable
The Court then examined the second Montana exception,
which asks whether the conduct threatens or as a direct effect on
specified areas such as the tribe's health or welfare. In spite of
conceding that "those who drive carelessly on a public highway
running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity,"
including tribal members, the Court held that the exception did not
apply because such a broad reading "would severely shrink the
rule., 9 6  In essence, the Court conceded that both exceptions
applied here if read literally yet nonetheless elected to apply
neither for its own amorphous policy reasons. While the Court
focused on the fact that the plaintiff was not herself a tribal
member (i.e., it relied on a consent-based view of tribal
sovereignty), the Court's phrasing of its holding clearly indicates
that it will apply to all cases where one nonmember brings suit
against another nonmember and the cause of action arose on fee
land within the reservation-or as here, on a federally granted state
right-of-way located on trust land.97 As did White's plurality in
Brendale, the Strate Court narrowed Montana by holding that the
exceptions do not apply when they seem to, but only under certain
elusive circumstances that are, curiously, never present in the cases
at hand.
In summary, the cases from Oliphant to Strate demonstrate
that the Court has gradually been divesting tribal sovereignty over
the past three decades with little regard for the intent of Congress.
Much of the language in these cases suggests that the Court is
motivated to divest tribal sovereignty by its own social contract
ideals.
A. The Court's Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty
This section discusses the Supreme Court's recent trend of
debasing tribal sovereignty. This trend began in 1998 with Alaska
96
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v. Native Village of Venetie98 and is evident in at least one other
case. 99 The Court's debasement of tribal sovereignty consists in its
characterization of tribal sovereignty as a special right to which
only a weak and defenseless tribe may lay claim. This
characterization is similar to the way the Court currently views
affirmative action programs; this similarity in turn suggests that the
Court is distrustful of tribal sovereignty because it views it as a
racial entitlement, which violates liberal equality theory.
However, this characterization of tribal sovereignty sharply
contrasts with the Court's view of state sovereignty as necessary to
maintain states' integrity and as a central requirement of
federalism.
1. Narrowing the Scope of the Statutory Definition of Indian
Country to Cover only Tribes under the Active Control of
Congress: Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, the Supreme Court
narrowed the definition of Indian Country in order to hold that
Alaska Native Villages did not have sovereign power to tax
contractors and other commercial entities working within Village
boundaries. The decision was ostensibly based on a statutory
definition of Indian Country,100 but the Court's interpretation of the
definition broke with the prior decisions of federal circuit courts
(which had been largely in agreement on the matter), 01 as well as
with previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which
98 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 118 S. Ct. 948, 1998 WL 75038 (Feb.
25, 1998).
99
See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 118 S. Ct.
1700, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3406 (May 26, 1998).
100 Venetie, 1998 WL 75038, at *5 (discussing the statutory definition of
Indian Country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
101
See Warren, Denetsosie, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government: Redefining Indian Country 28-29 (Sept. 24, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author); see also Brief of the Navajo Nation et al., at part
II.A-B; Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286 (9'h Cir. 1996) (No.
96-1577).
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Congress had sought to codify in the statutory provision. 0 2 In
doing so, the Court transmuted the widely utilized multi-factor test
as to when a dependent Indian community (not located on a
reservation) would be considered Indian Country into a rigid,
significantly narrower two-part test.10 3  The decision seemingly
overruled several circuit court cases10 4 and possibly the Supreme
Court's canonized opinion in United States v. Sandoval.
10 5
102
See Denetsosie, supra note 102, at 13-22; Brief of the Navajo Nation et al.,
su],ra note 102, at part II.B.
See Denetsosie, supra note 102, at 17. The two-part test requires that the
lands both "have been set aside by the Federal Government for use of the
Indians as Indian land" and that they be "under federal superintendence."
Venetie, 1998 WL 75038, at *5.
104
See Denetsosie, supra note 102, at 32; Brief of the Navajo Nation et al.,
sura note 102, at "Interest of the Amici Curiae."
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). The Venetie Court
purported to rely on Sandoval and to distinguish it. See Venetie, 1998 WL
75038, at *5. Due to the Venetie Court's apparent misreading of Sandoval, its
definition of Indian Country would actually exclude Sandoval-as had been
recognized. See Brief of the Navajo Nation et al., supra note 102, at "Interest of
the Amici Curiae." (In the Navajo Nation Brief, the Pueblo, whose land was at
issue in Sandoval, argued that the view of Indian Country ultimately adopted by
the Venetie Court would abrogate the Pueblo's sovereignty over their own land.)
Sandoval is arguably overruled by Venetie because the Pueblo land in
Sandoval was not "set aside by the Federal Government for the use of Indians as
Indian land," as the Venetie decision required. Venetie, 1998 WL 75038, at *5.
Rather, it was granted to the Indians in fee by the Spanish government before
the territory of New Mexico was acquired by the United States. See Sandoval,
231 U.S. at 39. The Venetie Court also stated that the federal government-in
the Sandoval case-had enacted laws governing the Pueblo land pursuant to its
guardianship of the land. Venetie, 1998 WL 75038, at *5. In a footnote,
however, the Court admits that the statute itself was not deemed applicable to
the Pueblo lands until after the Sandoval decision had been issued. Id. at *5,
n.4.
Interestingly, in the years leading up to Sandoval, the territory of New
Mexico apparently argued that the Pueblo were not Indians in order to gain
control of the Indian lands--just as the State of Alaska had argued that the
Natives were not Indians in the years leading up to Venetie-also in the hopes of
gaining control of the Native land. See DAvID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 189-90 (3rd ed. 1993) (discussing the
situation in New Mexico prior to Sandoval). See also Valencia-Weber, supra
note 30, at 1300-12 (discussing Alaska's campaign to destroy the sovereignty of
Alaskan Natives).
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In deciding that the Netsa'ii Gwich'in, who inhabit the
Village of Venetie, were not a dependent Indian community, the
Court dismissed the fact that the Netsa'ii Gwich'in were a
recognized tribe, 10 6 a fact which itself indicates that the community
was under some form of federal superintendence as required by the
Court. 10 7  Moreover, the State of Alaska did not contest the
Village's averment that the Netsa'ii Gwich'in had occupied Indian
Country prior to the passage of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA)1 8 Thus, absent a sua sponte finding
that no Indian Country had ever existed in Alaska, which it did not
make, the Court could only find that Indian Country did not
presently exist because it had been abrogated by the ANCSA.
However, the ANCSA's provisions merely changed the nature of
the land title held by Natives; it did not purport to extinguish, or
even limit, tribal sovereignty. 10 9 The Court nonetheless found the
106
Venetie, 1998 WL 75038 at *7 n.5. See also Donald Craig Mitchell,
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial
Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 353, 409 (1997)
(acknowledging that Alaskan Native Villages have been officially recognized as
tribes by the Secretary of the Interior).
107 See Brief of the Navaho Nation et al., supra note 102, at part III (arguing
that official federal recognition of a tribe is sufficient evidence of the political
dependency required to establish the existence of a dependent Indian
community).
108 See Brief of Amici Curiae Indian Law Professors in Support of
Affirmance, at part 111.1, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286 (91
Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1577). ANCSA can be found at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-29.
109 See Venetie, 98 WL75038, at *7-8; 43 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 1998)
(providing that, in exchange for the money received pursuant to ANCSA,
Alaskan Natives must agree to extinguishment of their aboriginal title to most of
the rest of Alaska); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (West 1998) (providing for conveyance
of lands to Village Corporations composed of Native Village residents); 43
U.S.C.A. § 1618 (West 1998) (revoking existing reservations, with one
exception, but providing that a Village Corporation could convey the former
reservation land to the Tribe if it agreed to opt out of the other provisions of
ANCSA); see also THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY 137 (1995) (stating
that "ANCSA did not address the issue of Native sovereignty"). Note that the
Village of Venetie elected to take title to its former reservation as allowed by 43
U.S.C.A. § 1618. BERGER, supra, at 141; Venetie, 1998 WL 7508, at *3. With
respect to its land, then, the Village was thus in much the same position it had
been prior to the passage of ANCSA.
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ANCSA's provisions to be inconsistent with tribal sovereignty, 110
thus violating the "fundamental" principle of Indian law "that
tribal powers of self-government may be extinguished only by a
clear and specific expression of Congress."'
1
Finally, the Venetie Court's view that federal
superintendence of the Indian land was sufficient to create a
dependent Indian community would entail "active... control...
[of] the lands in question" is diametrically opposed to Congress'
policy of self-determination. 112 If the federal government
undertook active control of Indian land, it would be powerless to
implement its self-determination goals that promote Indian control
of the land. In effect, the Venetie Court foreclosed Congress'
announced policy of self-determination by forcing tribes (at least
those who lack a traditional reservation) and Congress to choose
between Indian assimilation into white culture, which would result
from a finding of divestment of tribal sovereignty, on the one hand,
and complete federal control of tribal land on the other.
Once again, the Supreme Court in Venetie seemed eager to
diminish tribal sovereignty regardless of whether it could find a
principled basis for doing so. A hint as to the reasons for the
Court's motives can be found in Justice Thomas' statement that the
ANCSA was designed to avoid "'any permanent racially defined
institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations."' " This statement
of the ANCSA's policy is misleading because, as will be discussed
in more detail in part III, the ANCSA was significantly amended to
allow for the indefinite continuation of the so-called "racially
defined institutions" at the Native shareholders' option.
114
Moreover, a tribe is not considered a racially defined institution
110
Venetie, 98 WL 75038, at *7-8.
I11
See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Affrance, supra
note 108, at part I (citing FELIx COHEN'S TREATISE ON INDIAN LAW, 1982). The
Court also failed to address the significance of the various amendments to
ANCSA, which made the Native Villages more akin to Indian reservations than
tey had been under the original version of ANCSA. See Part III, supra.
Venetie, 98 WL 75038, at *8. See also Brief of the Navajo Nation et al.,
supra note 102, at part III (describing Congress' current self-determination
policy).Venetie, 98 WL 75038, at *7 (quoting 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601(b)).
114 See Publ. L. 100-241, § 2 (1988).
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under the Court's own precedent.1 1 5  Thus, not only does the
current version of the ANCSA approve of permanent racially
defined institutions (insofar as the continuation of Native
government can be described as such), but it is inaccurate to divest
tribal sovereignty on the premise that divestment is necessary in
order to avoid sanctioning the existence of racially defined
institutions. This is because the Court has held that tribes are not
racially defined and the Alaskan Natives have been recognized as
tribal entities.
The fact that the Supreme Court invoked this effectively
disavowed portion of the ANCSA to justify its holding suggests
that it is again using liberal ideals in the Indian law context to
which they are especially unsuited. This time the liberal premises
invoked include a formal notion of race that is abstracted from its
relevant social context. The effect is that every instance in which
race is taken into account, even for remedial purposes, comes to be
seen as the moral equivalent of white supremacy." 6  This
conception is irrational when applied to Alaskan Natives as well as
to other subordinated groups. Alaskan Natives are a conquered
people who eke out their living from "one of the harshest
environments in the world.""' 7 By no stretch of the imagination
115
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). Note that there has been
some indication that Mancari is beginning to be interpreted more narrowly, or
even will be viewed as overruled, in light of the Court's recent decision in
Adarand Construction v. Pena, 515 U.S. 500 (1995). See, e.g., Williams v.
Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (reading Mancari to protect only
those statutes which "affect uniquely Indian interests" and further suggesting,
based on Justice Stevens' dissent in Adarand, that Adarand may have overruled
Mancari).
116
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind,"
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 257 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 129
(1976).
117
Brief of Alaska Federation of Natives et al., at part I.A., Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1577) (citations
omitted). Some Alaskan Natives have objected to the term "conquered" on the
basis that they never formally surrendered their sovereignty. See Edward
Thomas, President of Tlingit and Haida Central Council, Lecture at University
of California, Los Angeles School of Law (Feb. 5, 1998). Despite the validity of
this criticism, Alaskan Natives are treated by the United States government as a
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can their invocation of sovereign taxing powers be rendered the
moral equivalent of a discriminatory act by the Klu Klux Klan or a
neo-Nazi movement.
2. A Reluctant Adherence to Precedent: Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies
In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies,'1 8 the Supreme Court took the now unusual tack of
adhering to precedent to find in favor of a tribe. It held that the
Kiowa Tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit whether the
suit arose on or off the reservation or involved governmental or
commercial activity. 119 As a result, Manufacturing Technologies
was unable to sue the Kiowa Industrial Development Commission,
a tribal entity, for default on a promissory note in state court.120 in
coming to this conclusion, however, Justice Kennedy disparaged
the precedent, which constrained him and then proceeded to list
several policy reasons why sovereign immunity for Indian tribes
should be abolished or limited. 12 1 He ended by inviting Congress
to "abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching rule."'
122
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the court was extending
sovereign immunity and that the decision whether to accord
sovereign immunity to the tribes should be left to the states.
12 3
conquered people in the sense that they are required to abide by federal (and
some state) laws and may only exercise sovereignty to the extent permitted by
federal law.
118
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 118 S. Ct.
1700, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3406 (May 26, 1998).
119 Kiowa Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 1700, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3406, at *7.
120
Id.




Id. at *16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a. The Court's Policy Reasons for Abrogating Tribal
Immunity
While noting "Congress had failed to abrogate [tribal
immunity] in order to promote economic development and tribal
self-sufficiency," the Supreme Court nevertheless found this
rationale to be "inapposite to modem wide-ranging tribal
enterprises extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and
activities."'124 Moreover, while the doctrine at one time "might
have been thought necessary to protect tribal governments from
encroachment by States[,] . .. tribal immunity [now] extends
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-governance."'
125
Finally, the Court noted "immunity can harm those who are
unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of
tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter."'
126
The Court's discomfort with tribal immunity is telling.
First, it is illogical that the Court found the self-determination
rationale for tribal sovereign immunity to be inconsistent with
actual self-determination. The purported inconsistency appears to
be a logical impossibility, for how can a hope for self-
determination be inconsistent with its realization? Second, the
Court appears to deny that tribes still need protection from
politically more powerful states. One need only consider the
hostility that many states express towards tribes and recall that
Congress is comprised of all states and no tribal representatives to
perceive the continuing inequity of power between the two
entities. 127 A comparison of the populations on reservations to
those of surrounding states yields the same conclusion. The Court








See generally Valencia-Weber, supra note 30 (documenting state hostility
toward tribes). By suggesting a comparison between state power within the
federal system and tribal power, I do not mean to suggest that tribes should be
absorbed into the federal system. On the contrary, as separate sovereigns, tribes
should be able, ideally, to define their own status. But the small size of most
tribes and the fact that the states to some extent control the federal government
do place tribes in a vulnerable position.
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solely engaged in traditional tribal customs and activities, as
though Indians' refusal to conform to white stereotypes justifies a
demand for complete assimilation. Moreover, the Court's
statement that immunity exceeds what is necessary for tribal self-
governance is particularly ironic: the statement is only true
because the Court has increasingly divested tribal sovereignty on
its own initiative during the past decades. Finally, the Court
invokes liberal notions of fairness when it notes that a tribe could
use sovereign immunity to snag the unwitting, who, apparently in
the Court's opinion, neither actually consented to participation in
such an unequal bargain nor would knowingly consent.
b. The Court's Conception of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity is Based on Liberal Equality Theory
The Supreme Court's conception of tribal sovereign
immunity and, by extension tribal sovereignty itself, as a special
right which should be accorded only to the weak and defenseless
stands in sharp contrast to its usual conception of sovereign
immunity as an esteemed and necessary component of
governmental status. 128 As Alexander Hamilton said in the Eighty-
First Federalist Paper: "[ilt is inherent in the nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to suit by an individual without its consent."'129
Thus, it is not as though we expect other quasi-sovereigns, such as
states, to outgroW sovereign immunity once they have a sufficient
tax base. On the contrary, state sovereign immunity is an
important talisman of state power.' 30 The Court's discomfort with
128
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, _ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
129
Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting the Eighty-First Federalist Paper).130
While it may be argued that state and federal sovereign immunity are
inconsistent with democratic ideals, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.)
419, 454-55 (1793) (Blair, J., concurring); HART AND WESCHLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1002 (Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al.
eds., 4h ed. 1996), such immunity nonetheless remains well-established. See,
e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (strengthening
state sovereign immunity by diminishing the federal government's power to
abrogate it). Again, my comparison between states and tribes here is not meant
to suggest that they are functionally equivalent and should always be treated
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tribal immunity appears to extend not from its discomfort with the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in general, but rather from the
continued recognition of tribal sovereign immunity. That the
Court actually entreated Congress to abrogate tribal immunity
indicates the extent of its interest in effecting a wholesale
divestment of tribal sovereignty.
The Court's starkly diverging views of sovereignty suggest
that the Court views tribal sovereignty as a temporary measure
which the tribes should only be able to take advantage of until they
become self-sufficient enough to participate in the larger white
society on equal terms with everyone else. In this sense, the Court
seems to see tribal sovereignty as a need-based welfare program or
an affirmative action plan. Indeed, the Kiowa Tribe Court's view
of tribal sovereignty as inherently suspect is markedly similar to its
view of governmental affirmative actions plans.13 ' One can only
assume that the Court is viewing tribal sovereignty in this way
because it sees tribal power as a type of race-based power and thus
disapproves of it. Similarly, the Court's view of tribal sovereignty
as a temporary measure, which should be abandoned once the
playing field has been sufficiently leveled, corresponds with the
Court's insistence that affirmative action programs must be
designed to attain, rather than to maintain, racial balance.
132
Indeed, one can almost hear echoes in the Kiowa Tribe opinion of
Justice Bradley's exhortation that African-Americans, having
"'emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation..
. shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,.., take the
rank of mere citizen, and cease to be the special favorite of the
laws."'
133
similarly. "Instead, my point is that the Court is taking a very uncharacteristic
view of the doctrine of sovereign immunity when it evaluates tribal sovereign
immunity, whereas it employs its more typical view in evaluating state
sovereign immunity.
131 See, e.g, Adarand Construction v. Pena, 515 U.S. 500 (1995); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
1 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
133 Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and
Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13 (1990) (quoting The Civil
Rights Cases,109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
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The Court's implicit comparison between tribal sovereignty
and other race-based legislation is invalid in two major respects.
First, tribal rights are properly considered political rather than
racial.' 34 Second, the Court's view of affirmative action plans as
the moral equivalent of Jim Crow laws is itself wrongheaded.1
35
Because the Court's treatment of affirmative action programs is
misguided, its parallel treatment of tribal sovereignty on the basis
of the similarity between the two is also mistaken. Both Venetie
and Kiowa Tribe evince a view of tribal sovereignty as a special
need-based right, which should only be accorded temporarily, if at
all. The Court's distrust of tribal sovereignty appears to extend
from its conception of it as an inherently suspect racial entitlement,
which threatens to violate liberal equality theory.
In summary, over the past two decades, the Supreme Court
has increasingly diminished tribal sovereignty without regard to
Congressional wishes. It facilitated the process in Oliphant by
reversing the presumption in favor of tribal sovereignty to a
presumption against tribal sovereignty. While Oliphant ostensibly
involved only the area of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
the Court subsequently extended the Oliphant presumption to all
situations involving criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
through Duro, and to all situations involving civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, when the suit arose within reservation boundaries
but on land which was not under tribal control, and both parties are
nonmembers through such cases as Strate and Montana. The
Court has also evinced an increasing unwillingness to defer to
Congressional intent even in cases like Venetie, where statutes
evidencing such intent clearly should govern the case. Finally, in
those rare cases where the Court views precedent as too
unequivocal to depart from, it has resorted to adjuring Congress to
abrogate tribal sovereignty. All of these cases indicate that the
Court's own biases against tribal sovereignty are driving the
134
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See also Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native
Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 611 (1996) (emphasizing that only preferences
for members of Indian tribes are exempt from strict scrutiny under Mancari;
racial preferences, regardless of tribal membership, are not).
135
See Fiss, supra note 117, at 129-30.
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decisions rather than well-established doctrine and precedent.
Moreover, the cases from Oliphant to Strate evidence a trend of
shrinking tribal sovereignty which is driven by liberal social
contract notions of government. Venetie and Kiowa Tribe, in
contrast, evince a new trend: that of equating tribal sovereignty
with race-based preferences and invalidating it, or adjuring
Congress to abrogate it, on that basis. Both activist trends do a
severe disservice to Indian tribes and to our judicial ideals of
fairness of outcomes and predictability.
III. Two SUSPECT DEVICES USED TO DIVEST AND DEBASE
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: IGNORING THE CANONS OF
CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUING STATUTES WITH
REFERENCE TO SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
This part focuses on two of the suspect devices used to
abrogate tribal sovereignty in some of the foregoing cases. The
tack of ignoring or weakening the canons of construction in order
to reach a result which disfavors Indian tribes has been used in
Oliphant, Montana, and Venetie. The device of construing acts of
Congress without reference to subsequent legislative history or
changes in legislative policy is pursued in Montana, Brendale, and
Venetie. These two devices are not the only, or even the primary
means, the Court has used to divest and debase tribal
sovereignty. 136 Nonetheless, because they are fairly widespread,
thwart settled expectations, and often run directly contrary to
136
Other suspect methods used by the Court include the novel approach of
denying sovereignty in a specific area because the area had previously been
subject to federal control, see Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713 (1983); allowing
states to tax on-reservation sales by Indian tribes to tionmembers thus effectively
defeating the tribal power to tax, see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico
(1989); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Nation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980); and conditioning tribes' right to self-determination on their
willingness to engage only in traditional 'activities which conform to white
notions of what Indians are and how they should act, see Kiowa Tribe, 1998
LEXIS 3406 at *12 (suggesting that sovereign immunity no longer makes sense
because tribal enterprises extend "well beyond traditional tribal enterprises and
activities"); Montana, 450 U.S. at 556 (finding that the Crow Tribe could not
regulate nomnember fishing and noting that the Tribe traditionally had survived
by buffalo hunting rather than fishing).
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congressional intent, these two devices are among the most
pernicious of those used by the Court to divest and debase tribal
sovereignty.
A. Ignoring or Weakening the Canons of Construction to
Find against Indian Tribes
Briefly stated, the canons stand for the proposition that
"[t]reaties are to be construed as they were understood by the tribal
representatives who participated in their negotiation" and should
be "liberally interpreted to accomplish their protective purposes,
with ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the Indians."'137 The
canons of construction were originally limited to treaty
construction but were subsequently expanded to statutory
construction as well.1 38 As to statutes, "'the general rule [is] that
statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or
communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions
being resolved in favor of the Indians." ' 139 The statutory canon
has been extended to cover statutes, such as Public Law 280,
which do not seem to have been enacted for the benefit of Indian
tribes, 14 as well as to acts of Congress, which clearly were not
meant to benefit Indian tribes, including those abrogating tribal
sovereignty.141 The statutory canon can thus be stated as a general
rule "that tribal powers of self-government may be extinguished
only by a clear and specific expression of Congress."' 42 Neither
Oliphant, Montana, nor Venetie take proper account of the canons.
137 WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 88
(1988) (citations omitted). See also GETCHES, supra note 106, at 157.
138 See CANBY, supra note 138, at 89-90 (citations omitted); GETCHES, supra
note 106, at 345.
139 CANBY, supra, note 138, at 90 (quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v.
United States 78, 89 (1918)).
140 See id. (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976)).
141 See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Affirmance, supra
note 102, at part I (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)
and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984)).142 Id. (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 224-25,
242 (1998)).
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In each case, the Supreme Court's failure to give appropriate force
to the canons made it analytically less difficult for the Court to find
against Indian tribes in those decisions.
1. Ignoring and Weakening the Canons of Treaty
Construction in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
There are two places in the Oliphant opinion where the
Court fails to take proper account of the canons in its interpretation
of treaties. The first place where the Court ignores the canons is
when it states:
[N]one of the treaties signed by Washington Indians
in the 1850's explicitly proscribed criminal
prosecution and punishment of non-Indians by the
Indian tribes. As discussed below, however, several
of the treaty provisions can be read as recognizing
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be
in the United States rather than in the tribes. 143
In the absence of an explicit proscription of an exercise of tribal
power, the canons clearly mandate that the Court find that tribal
power in this area has not been abridged. However, without
mentioning the canons, the Court contents itself with the
conclusion that the treaties "can be read" to prohibit tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. This conclusion clearly conflicts
with the canons. The phrase "can be read" evinces ambiguity, yet
the canons militate that all ambiguities be resolved in favor of
Indians. The Court would have had a considerable amount of
explaining to do if it mentioned the canons here and acknowledged
that it was finding against the tribe in spite of them. Instead, the
Court declined to mention them, probably in the hope that readers
of the opinion would not notice or would consider the failure to be
merely an oversight.
Later in the opinion, the Court acknowledged the existence
of the canons but noted "treaty and statutory provisions which are
not clear on their face may 'be clear from surrounding
143
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 199 n.8 (emphasis added).
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circumstances and legislative history."' 144 The Court's quotation
of this phrase is misleading because surrounding circumstances
and legislative history had previously been used to find in favor of
a tribe despite a statute, which seemed clearly to indicate
Congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty. 145 Moreover,
DeCoteau v. District County Court,146 the case cited by the
Oliphant Court for the proposition, is clearly distinguishable in
that, in DeCoteau, all of the relevant sources pointed squarely
toward termination. DeCoteau was thus very different from
Oliphant, where the Court used surrounding circumstances and
legislative history to override ambiguous treaty provisions.
147
On balance, the Oliphant Court did rely on other factors
besides the Suquamish treaty and surrounding circumstances in
finding tribal jurisdiction to have been divested. As discussed in
part II.A.1, however, all four factors were questionable. For
example, the factor relied upon most heavily by the Court (i.e., the
alleged inconsistency between the tribe's exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers and its dependent status) 14 had not
been invoked by the Court since the 1830s 14 9 and had thus,
arguably, fallen into disuse-thereby rendering it a questionable
rationale.
2. Falling to Acknowledge the Canons of Treaty Construction
in Montana v. United States
Although the Court in Montana v. United States spends
several pages analyzing the treaty that created the Crow
reservation, it fails to mention the canons of construction, which
mandate that all ambiguities in treaties be resolved in favor of the
tribe. Instead, the opinion merely applies the canon of construction
144 Id. at 208 n.17 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
444 (1975)).
145 See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973).
146 DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
147
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444.
148 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.149
See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 453 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).150 Montana, 450 U.S. at 550-59.
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regarding river beds, which creates a presumption against the
United States' having conveyed a river bed to a party other than a
state, without even acknowledging or discussing the conflict
between the two sets of canons.' 1 As Barsh and Henderson have
pointed out, the Supreme Court was able to conclude that the river
bed did not pass to the tribe through the treaty only by erroneously
relying on United States v. Holt State Bank 52 and by construing
the treaty as a land grant to the tribe rather than as a representation
of what the tribe retained of its aboriginal holdings. 153 If the treaty
were properly read as a description of the property rights retained
by the tribe, the canon as to the United States' conveyance of river
beds would not apply and the canon regarding resolving
ambiguities in favor of tribes would mandate a finding for the tribe
on this issue. Only Justice Stevens' concurrence in Montana
mentioned the canons of construction favoring Indian tribes.
154
However, even Stevens quickly dispensed with the canons by
treating the inapplicable holding in Holt State Bank as
controlling.
155
3. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Ignoring the Canons of
Statutory Construction
The underlying question in Venetie was whether the
ANCSA had abrogated the Netsa'ii Gwich'in's tribal
sovereignty. 5 6 The issue of whether the statutory definition of




United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). Barsh and
Henderson argue that Holt State Bank is inapplicable because it involved the
issue of whether, upon the tribe's cession of its reservation, the bed of a lake
vested automatically in the state or vested instead in the United States. The
issue was not whether the tribe originally had title to the lake-bed under its
treaty with the United States. Barsh and Henderson, supra note 26, at 677.153
Barsh and Henderson, supra note 26, at 675, 677.154
Montana, 450 U.S. at 567 (Stevens, J., concurring).155
Id. at 568.
156 See Venetie, 1998 WL 75038 at *3; Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors
in Support of Aff'rmance, supra note 102, at part III (noting that it was
"uncontroverted that Indian country existed in Alaska before ANCSA").
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under the ANCSA, on which the Court focused, should not have
been reached absent a finding that the ANCSA had abrogated the
tribe's prior, uncontroverted sovereignty over the land. 157  To
answer this underlying question, the Court should have used the
statutory canon of construction and analyzed whether the
preexisting "tribal powers of self-government [were] . .
extinguished by a clear and specific expression of Congress." 158 In
doing so, all ambiguities should have been resolved in favor of the
Alaskan Natives and the statute should have been construed the
way that the Natives understood it.159 Thus, the Court would have
been constrained to find, had it properly employed the canons of
construction, that the ANCSA contained no such expression of a
clear and specific intent to extinguish tribal sovereignty. 6 Instead
the statute merely dealt with the character of land title held by the
157 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Affirmance, supra
note 102, at "Summary of Argument" and part III.
158 Id. at part I (emphasis added). The Montana and Brendale Courts also
failed to employ the statutory canons in finding that the allotment acts had
divested tribal regulatory power over non-Indian fee land. See Part II.B.1 supra.
Had the Court carefully considered the allotment acts in those cases, it would
have found that they evinced no clear Congressional intent to abrogate
regulatory authority over the fee land if the reservations were ultimately to
continue. See id.
159 This aspect of the canons is also very important in the context of ANCSA
because the Natives argued against a permanent trust relationship with the
United States government in order to secure a greater right to self-determination
(with less federal interference). See Brief of Alaska Federation of Natives et al.,
supra note 116, at part II.A.. It is quite ironic that the measure that Natives
supported to further their own self-determination was ultimately used to force
their assimilation. It is difficult not to be reminded of the days of treaty making
where United States' representatives would tell the Indian tribes that the treaties
said whatever the representative thought the tribe wanted to hear in order to get
the tribe to sign onto an utterly different treaty which was much less favorable to
the tribe. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding a
treaty modification in spite of the evidence that the United States agents lied to
the Tribe about the effects of the modification and failed to get the necessary
number of signatures to put the modification into effect).
160
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Affirmance, supra
note 102, at part 111.2. See also Mitchell, supra note 107, at 430 (arguing that
ANCSA did not explicitly abrogate tribal sovereignty and that the State
therefore should not have conceded that Alaskan Natives occupied Indian
country prior to ANCSA).
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Native Alaskans. 161 The Court's failure to apply the canons to the
ANCSA was particularly problematic in this instance because the
unique situation of the Native Village of Venetie was not
conducive to a finding of abrogation (i.e., the Village had elected
to opt out of most of the provisions of the ANCSA in exchange for
having the land comprising Venetie's former reservation
transferred back to the tribe). 162 Thus, the village was in a situation
similar to that prior to the enactment of the ANCSA.
In sum, the Court has elected to ignore or weaken the
canons of construction in Indian law whenever it becomes
expedient for it to do so.163 This discretionary use of the canons of
construction is dangerous because the canons were meant to
protect tribes against manipulation and coercion by the United
States government that often results from political pressures. If the
canons are to be effective, they must be employed consistently, in
spite of political pressures felt by the Court or the personal policy
views of the Justices. Ironically, however, the canons are now
being selectively employed by the Court to enforce its own policy
considerations. They are no longer an independent check on the
legislature; instead, selective application of the canons has become
a means of thwarting legislative intent when that intent may benefit
tribes in a way that the Court disapproves of.
161
See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Affirmance, supra
note 102, at "Summary of Argument" and part 111.2.
162
See id. at part 111.1. See also BERGER, supra note 110, at 141; Venetie,
1998 WL 7508 at *3.
163
This is not to say that the canons have been completely abandoned by the
Court. In fact they were applied quite recently, to assist the Court in reaching a
positive result for tribal sovereignty, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), and were mentioned in South Dakota v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 118 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1998). Moreover,
Professor Goldberg has suggested that the canons have not been discarded but
instead weakened, so that the Court may be employing them only when two
competing interpretations of a statute or treaty are in complete equipoise. See
Carole Goldberg, Federal Indian Law Lecture at the University of California,
Los Angeles School of Law (Mar. 24, 1998). My point is that the Court has
neglected them altogether in some analytically difficult cases which were also of
immense importance to tribal sovereignty and that it has generally not employed
them in recent cases with the frequency and analytical force which it used to
accord them.
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B. Construing Statutes Without Reference to Subsequent
History as Means of Enforcing Abandoned and
Repudiated Assimilationist Policies
The device of ignoring subsequent legislative history and
policy changes in construing statutes was used in Montana and
Brendale in order to give effect to the repudiated assimilationist
policies of the allotment acts. 164 It was used in Venetie to give
effect to the assimilationist component of the ANCSA, which had
since been abandoned-as evidenced by the various amendments
to the ANCSA. The widespread use of this device is relatively
new to the Court. Indeed, in some previous Indian law cases, the
Court gave effect to Congress' current Indian policy in construing
statutes enacted under vastly different policy frameworks. 165 The
device of ignoring subsequent legislative history and
Congressional policy changes allows the Court to appear to be
deferring to Congressional intent while concomitantly thwarting
contemporary Congressional intent.
1. The Abandoned and Repudiated Allotment Policy
The allotment period began in the 1880s and extended until
1928.166 During that period, Congress passed several different
allotment acts, which ended communal tribal ownership of Indian
reservations and mandated that the reservations be divided up into
individual tracts and allotted to tribal members. 167 The purpose of
allotment was to force Indians to assimilate into mainstream white
164 Another case in which this device is used to continue to enforce allotment
policies is County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253-55 (1992). This case does not involve the
reach of tribal sovereignty per se but rather the state's ability to tax reservation
land owned in fee by tribal members and to impose a tax on sales of such land.165 See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404
(1968).
166
See GETCHES, supra note 106, at 190-91, 215.
167 See id. at 191.
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culture. 168  The allotment policy and its underlying goal of
assimilation were specifically repudiated in 1934 by the Indian
Reorganization Act,169 which forbade further allotment of
reservations' 70 and created a framework for the reestablishment of
tribal governments. 171  Although Congress propounded self-
determination as its official policy towards Native Americans after
1934, as it does today,172 the Court continues to give effect to the
abandoned and repudiated allotment policy in cases such as
Montana and Brendale.
In Montana, the Supreme Court relied in part on the
repudiated allotment acts in deciding that Congress did not intend
for the Crow Indians to have ability to regulate hunting and fishing
on non-Indian owned fee land within reservation boundaries.
173
The Court first acknowledged that the treaty between the Crow
Indian Tribe and the United States granted the tribe the "'absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation"' of the reservation land-and
therefore arguably conferred regulatory authority on the tribe.
1 74
However, the Court then went on to rule that this authority had
been divested by the allotment acts-at least with respect to
reservation lands now owned in fee by non-Indians-because the
very alienation of the land prevented the Indians from exercising
their treaty-based right to absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation of the land. 175 Thus, according to the Montana Court's
reasoning, once the right to undisturbed use and occupation of the
land was abrogated, any derivative rights (such as the right to
regulate hunting and fishing) were also abrogated for "[i]t defies
common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-
168
See id. at 190.169
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-479 (West 1998).170 25 U.S.C.A. § 461 (West 1998).
171 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (West 1998).
172 See Barsh and Henderson, supra note 26, at 685. The self-determination
policy was itself briefly repudiated, during the period from 1945 to 1961, after
which the self-determination policy was put back into effect. See GETCHES,
su1 ra note 106, at 229-233.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 & 559 n.9.




Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal
jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was
the ultimate destruction of tribal government."
176
This reasoning would make sense if the allotment policy
were still in place-or at least had not been specifically repudiated;
however, as the Court later points out, the policy was officially
repudiated and allotment was stopped.' 77 The Court does not make
an effort to explain why it continues to enforce the obsolete policy
and to further "the ultimate destruction of tribal government": one
has to wonder if the reason is not simply that Court is more
sympathetic to the allotment policy than to the current policy of
self-determination. Instead of explaining its reasoning in more
detail, the Court simply affirms that the treaty language must be
read in light of the subsequent allotment policy, which resulted in
alienation of much reservation land to non-Indians. Why this
alienation should not in turn be considered in light of the current
self-determination policy (which is more in accord with the
rejected treaty language) remains a mystery. All that can be said is
that the Court apparently defers to Congress more readily when it
contracts tribal rights than when it seeks to expand them-
although Congress' plenary power clearly gives it the authority to
do either. 178 By following this course, the Court puts the United
States in a situation in which its many mistakes with respect to
Indian tribes and the multitude of wrongs it has inflicted upon
them will linger on indeterminately, in spite of the fact that even
many of the perpetrators of the misguided policies have realized
their mistakes. Moreover, both the White and Stevens pluralities
in Brendale relied on the Montana Court's interpretation of the
allotment acts in determining that the tribe lacked zoning authority
176 Id. at 559 n.9.
177
Id.178 Cf Clinton, supra note 47, at 98 (suggesting that the Court will act to
protect minority rights only when non-Indians are in the minority, as on an
Indian reservation, and that it will not offer similar protection when Indians are
in the minority and their rights are being infringed by non-Indians, and further
arguing that the Court exercises a "hands off approach" in federal Indian law
only when Indian rights are in danger).
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over at least part of its reservation. 179 The White plurality would
have found the alienation of the land pursuant to the General
Allotment Act (i.e., the Dawes Act) 180 to divest the tribe of all
regulatory authority over the land owned in fee by non-Indians.' 8'
It deemed Congress' repudiation of the allotment policy
"irrelevant" based on the facts that the lands remained alienated
after the allotment policy was repudiated and that the Indians were
not restored exclusive and undisturbed use of them.1
8 2
Stevens took a more moderate-but similarly misguided-
view of the effects of the General Allotment Act. While
acknowledging that the General Allotment Act "did not itself
transfer any regulatory power from the tribe to any state or local
government authority," Stevens argued that, "by providing for the
allotment and ultimate alienation of reservation land, the Act in
some respects diminished tribal authority.' 813 He also noted that:
[a]lthough it is inconceivable that Congress would
have intended that the sale of a few lots would
divest the Tribe of the power to determine the
character of the tribal community, it is equally
improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe
would retain its interest in regulating the use of vast
ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack
any voice in setting tribal policy. 184
"
179
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422-425, 436-40.
180
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-34, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (West 1998).
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 423, 425 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).182
Id. at 423. How Congress could have undone the alienation without
infringing on the non-Indian land owners' rights is an interesting question. The
Court has repeatedly found Congressional attempts to restore ownership of
allotted lands to tribes to be unconstitutional because of infringement on the
individual landowners' rights. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 U.S. 727 (1997);
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Because the Court has repeatedly
invalidated such attempts, it is odd for the Court to use the fact that Congress
has not restored the lands to the Indians for their undisturbed use as a reason for
finding that the Indians lack any power over the lands whatsoever.183 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
184 Id. at 437.
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Like White, however, Stevens does not give effect to the fact that
the General Allotment Act was ultimately repudiated, nor does he
consider the alienation caused by the General Allotment Act in
light of this subsequent repudiation.
Stevens' analysis of the continuing effect of the General
Allotment Act illustrates the problems with trying to construe the
intent behind a repudiated policy. He notes that it is
"inconceivable that Congress would have intended the sale of a
few lots to divest the Tribe of its power to determine the character
of the tribal community." 18 5 As a strict construal of Congressional
intent, this statement is neither true nor false, because the Congress
that passed the General Allotment Act did not intend the sale of
only a few lots but rather the destruction of the entire reservation.
Indeed, one could argue that White's opinion is more true to the
Congressional intent behind the General Allotment Act because
White attempted to facilitate, albeit in a small way, the destruction
of the reservation envisioned by the Congress that passed the
General Allotment Act in 1887. However, Justice White's
approach is more problematic than Justice Stevens' approach in
that it resurrects a policy that that is contrary to the Congressional
policy in effect today.
The conflict between White and Stevens in Brendale
demonstrates that Congressional intent behind repudiated policies
should not be given any effect-especially in the Indian law
context where Congressional intent is very influential to the
Court's ultimate decision. If the intent behind the repudiated
policy is given full effect, the repudiated policy is resurrected in
direct contravention of contemporary Congressional intent and
policy. On the other hand, if the policy is given effect in light of
subsequent developments, such as the halting of allotment, the
result is nonsensical because we cannot know what the Congress
that passed the repudiated policy would have wanted had it known
that the policy would be repudiated. Moreover, the repudiation of
a policy itself casts doubt on the salience of the intent behind the
policy. Thus, when a policy has been repudiated, no effect should
be given to the intent of the Congress that passed the repudiated
policy. Instead, the Congress that repudiated the policy or, in the
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Indian law context, the intent and policies of the current Congress
should be given effect. Taking the statutory canons into account in
analyzing such policies also proves helpful. Perhaps in choosing
between the intent of the Congress that repudiated the policy and
that of the contemporary Congress, the Court should simply look
to which policy consideration would be more favorable to the tribe
in question and resolve any ambiguities in the tribe's favor.
2. The ANCSA and Alaskan Native Sovereignty
The ANCSA 186 was enacted in 1971. It was subsequently
amended in 1976,187 1988,188 1990,189 1992,19 and 1995.1' The
ANCSA extinguished Alaskan Natives' aboriginal title over the
majority of Alaska. In exchange for the aboriginal title, the
ANCSA organized Alaskan Native Villages as corporations and
allowed the corporations to choose land bases to which they would
then take surface title in fee simple.192 Originally, the corporate
stock could be alienated to anyone, including non-Natives, after
1991. Additionally, it could be lost through corporate
bankruptcy. 193 Thus, the goals of the ANCSA, as it was originally
formulated, were assimilationist. 194 It was designed to turn Native
tribes into the equivalent of white America's municipalities, with
public land being used for profit-making purposes. Subsistence
living, which Alaskan Natives relied on for their livelihood, was to
become secondary or forsaken completely.
186
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1628 (West 1998).
187
See Pub. L. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1147 (1976).188 See Pub. L. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (1988).
189
See Pub. L. 101-378, 104 Stat. 468 (1990).190 See Pub. L. 102-415, 106 Stat. 2112 (1992).
191 See Pub. L. 104-42, 109 Stat. 353 (1995) and Pub. L. 104-10, 109 Stat. 155
(1995).
192
See Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Twenty Five Years of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act: Self-Determination or Destruction of the Heritage, Culture, and
Way of Life of Alaska's Native Americans?, 12 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 305, 325
(1997).
193
See BERGER, supra note 110, at 99.
194 See id at88.
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However, the numerous amendments to the ANCSA
significantly modified its capitalist and assimilationist agenda in
order to "guarantee Natives continued participation in decisions
affecting their rights and property" and to "enable the shareholders
of each Native Corporation to structure the further implementation
of the settlement in light of their particular circumstances and
needs." 195 The so-called "1991 Amendments," actually enacted in
1988, provided that corporate stock could be restricted from
alienation indefinitely at the option of Native shareholders.196 The
1991 Amendments also provided that land owned by Village
corporations would not be taxable as long as it remained
undeveloped and the Village Corporation did not borrow money
against it. 197 These Amendments also added a provision stating
that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, Alaska Natives
shall remain eligible for all Federal Indian programs on the same
basis as other Native Americans."' 198 As part of the Congressional
Findings and Declarations, the 1991 Amendments provided that
they did not, "unless specifically provided, constitute a repeal or
modification . . . of any provision of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act; or . . . confer on, or deny to, any Native
organization any degree of sovereign governmental authority over
lands.., or persons in Alaska."'19
9
In spite of the above disclaimer, the 1991 Amendments to
the ANCSA drastically modified the assumptions underlying the
statute. Looking at the entire amended version of the statute, it is
no longer possible to contend that the authors contemplate
assimilation of the Natives into white culture after a brief transition
period. Rather, the provisions prohibiting taxation of undeveloped
Native land, allowing for indefinite restraints on alienation of
corporate stock, and providing that Alaskan Natives have the same
rights as other Native Americans all help facilitate the continuation
19519 Pub. L. 100-241, § 2(5), 101 Stat. 1788 (1988).196
See BERGER, supra note 110, at xiii; see also 43 U.S.C.A. § 1629(c) (West
1998).
197
See BERGER, supra note 110, at xiii; see also 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d) (West
1998).
198
43 U.S.C.A. § 1626(d) (West 1998).
199 Pub. L. 100-241, § 2(8), 101 Stat. 1788 (1988).
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of Alaskan Native culture in its current form. The prohibition on
taxation allows Natives to continue to use their land for subsistence
activities, such as hunting and fishing, that do not generate
revenue. The provision allowing indefinite restraints on alienation
permits Alaskan Natives to stave off outside influences that may
threaten their subsistence activities. Similarly, the provision that
Alaskan Natives are entitled to the same federal protections as
other Native Americans should be read to entitle Alaskan Natives
to a baseline protection of their sovereignty and cultural activities.
Moreover, as previously noted, the new self-determination goals of
the ANCSA, which are hinted at in these new provisions, are
specifically articulated in the Congressional findings preceding the
1991 Amendments.
20
At the time Venetie was decided, the portion of the
ANCSA's Congressional findings on which Justice Thomas relied
upon in finding against Venetie's attempted assertion of its
sovereign taxing power remained in place-i.e., 43 U.S.C.A. §
1601 still stated that the ANCSA was intended to accomplish the
settlement of Native Alaskan land claims without creating any
"permanent racially defined institutions. ' 20 1  However, the
ANCSA's formerly assimilationist agenda, as embodied in this
provision, had nonetheless been gutted by the amendments. While
the Congressional finding technically remained in place, the 1991
200 See Pub. L. 100-241, § 2(5), 101 Stat. 1788 (1988).
211
43 U.S.C.A. § 1601(b) (West 1998). See also Venetie, 1998 WL 75038 at
*3. The practice of leaving in original provisions even after adding in
apparently conflicting provisions is not unique to the Congressional findings
portions of ANCSA and its amendments. For instance, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1620(d)
(part of the original ANCSA) states that land owned by Alaskan Native
Corporations will be exempt for property taxes for 20 years, provided that it is
not developed or leased. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1620(d)(1) (West 1998). Section
1636(d), however, (which is part of the 1991 Amendments) provides that,
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law .... all land .. .in Alaska
conveyed by the Federal government pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act... to a Native... corporation ... shall be exempt, so long as
such land and interests are not developed or leased or sold ... from ... real
property taxes . . . ." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d)(1) (West 1998). Given the
prevalence of this unusual practice, it is particularly deceptive to quote a
provision of the original ANCSA in isolation, without reference to changes
wrought by the amendments.
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Amendments made the maintenance of permanent, racially defined
institutions possible at the Native shareholders' option. Thus,
regardless of whether the various amendments repealed any part of
the original ANCSA, it is misleading to use ANCSA as it is
presently constituted to stand for the assimilationist goal of
dissolving tribes because of their racial character. To the contrary,
the current ANCSA stands for the goals of self-determination and
of letting Natives define their own objectives-even when such
objectives include the permanent maintenance of tribal
governments.
Justice Thomas later in the opinion, again indicated that the
ANCSA stands for an assimilationist Congressional agenda when
he stated that:
ANCSA transferred reservation land to state-
chartered corporations without any significant use
restrictions, and 'with the goal of avoiding 'any
permanent racially defined institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations.' . . . Because Congress
contemplated that non-Natives could own the
Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe is free
to use it for non-Indian purposes, we must conclude
that the federal set-aside requirement is not met.20
2
Again, this description is misleading in light of the latest
amendments to the ANCSA. While ANCSA originally
contemplated that non-Indians could, and probably would, own
stock in the Native corporations after 1991, the amendments
contemplate that the corporations may be permanently limited to
Native ownership. Moreover, the Court's focus on the Village's
ability to use the land for non-Indian purposes reveals an attempt
to force Indians to adopt quaint, archaic customs as the price for
their sovereignty. Contrary to the Court's stereotypical view of
Indians, an "Indian purpose" is nothing more than a purpose an
Indian tribe has decided to employ. Thus, Indian tribes have
engaged in cigarette sales, gambling, and oil, gas, and mineral
mining on their reservations, as well as a myriad of other
202 Venetie, 1998 WL 75038 at *7.
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activities. 20 3  Indian tribes have also leased portions of their
reservations to non-Indians to enable them to engage in such
activities.20 4  Such activities have never been used to foreclose
their right to exercise sovereign governmental powers on their
reservations. On the contrary, having tribes decide for themselves
what uses they will put their land to is a hallmark of self-
determination, not a reason for foreclosing it. As previously noted,
the 1991 Amendments specifically cite self-determination goals as
a primary reason for their adoption.20 5 It is thus incredibly ironic
to use the increased options afforded tribes under the ANCSA and
its amendments as a reason for foreclosing the exercise of tribal
sovereignty.
Nowhere in the Venetie Court's decision does it discuss the
significance of the amendments to the ANCSA. For the most part,
it construes the ANCSA as an assimilationist piece of legislation-
which it was originally enacted to be.20 6 Once again, in construing
legislation without reference to its amendments, the Court makes
itself an obstacle to Congress' attempts to implement its current
Indian law policies. It does so at the expense of tribal sovereignty
and settled expectations generally.20 7  Instead of permitting
Congress and the United States as a whole to move beyond its
mistakes with respect to its Indian policies, the Supreme Court
forces the U.S. to continue to make those mistakes long after
Congress has attempted to remedy them.
203 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Nation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
204
See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).205
See Pub. L. 100-241, § 2(5), 101 Stat. 1788 (1988).206
See BERGER, supra note 110, at 88.207
Additionally, by treating tribes merely as components of the United States,
with a relatively uncertain status, the Court does them the additional disservice
of not recognizing and respecting their separate governmental status.
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VI. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF SOCIAL
CONTRACT THEORY TO INDIAN TRIBES
As discussed in part II, the Supreme Court has routinely
used social contract theory to justify its move from a territorially-
based to a consent-based conception of tribal sovereignty. Indeed
all of the cases discussed in part II.A, including Oliphant,
Montana, Brendale, Duro, and Strate, as well as Stevens' dissent
in Merrion, relied to some extent upon social contract language in
rationalizing the opinions. This part argues that it is inappropriate
to apply social contract theory to Indian tribes because social
contract theory, as exemplified by John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice20 8 is: (1) a peculiarly Western doctrine that should not be
forced upon non-Western peoples; (2) is premised upon the notion
of a homogeneous culture which poses special problems for
minority cultures;20 9 and (3) because social contract theory is
misapplied by the Court.
A. An Introduction to Rawls' Social Contract Theory
Rawls bases his theory ofjustice on two principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar
208
See RAWLS, supra note 21, at 11. I use Rawls' work as the primary
example of social contract theory because he is probably the most prominent
social contract theorist in America today and because the Court does not purport
to be relying on any particular social contract theory. However, it is worth
noting that others have suggested that the Court uses Lockean social contract
theory to justify its Indian law decisions. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 11,
at 74. Since Rawls merely builds on the work of earlier social contract theorists,
it should not be misleading to rely on his work even if the Justices actually have
relied upon an earlier social contract theory. See RAWLS, supra note 21, at 11.209 In making this argument, I rely substantially on Will Kymlicka's work.
See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE
(1989). However, my disagreement with Rawls extends beyond Kymlicka's, as
I question liberalism's usefulness with respect to minority cultures whereas
Kymlicka simply seeks to modify Rawls' theory to accommodate such cultures.
Moreover, as others have pointed out, Kymlicka appears to view aboriginal
peoples as part of a multicultural United States, rather than as separate entities.
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liberty for others. Second: social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all.
210
The two principles are serially ordered such that the first is always
given primacy and the second may never be used to justify
compromising the first.211 Moreover, the principles "distinguish
between those aspects of the social system that define and secure
the equal liberties of citizenship and those that specify and
establish social and economic inequalities."
212
Rawls arrives at these principles by imagining a
hypothetical "initial situation" in which people would rationally
choose these principles without knowing anything about their
social situation in life, their talents, or their personal goals and
beliefs. l3 Such a theory of justice is termed a social contract
theory because it conceives of a just society as one that operates
according to principles to which people would hypothetically have
210
RAWLS, supra note 21, at 60. According to the second principle, "it must
be reasonable for each relevant representative man [or woman] . . . to prefer his
[or her] prospects with the inequality to his [or her] prospects without it." Id. at
64. Moreover, Rawls sees inequalities in terms of differences in allotment of
primary social goods, which include, "rights and liberties, opportunities and
powers, income and wealth... [and] a sense of one's own worth." Id. at 92. This
conception of primary goods is in turn based on the liberal idea "that a person's
good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of life
given reasonably favorable circumstances [and that] [A] man is happy when he
is more or less successful in the way of carrying out this plan." Id. at 92-93.
Each person, moreover, is presumed to be rational and therefore able to
personally choose the life plan which will give her the most happiness. Id. at 94,
129. Because the two principles are ultimately based on this idea that happiness
stems from personal choices, all of which are entitled to equal deference, Rawls
notes that "the principles of justice do not permit subsidizing universities and
institutes, or opera and the theater, on the grounds that these institutions are
intrinsically valuable." Id. at 332.
211




See id at 11-12, 137.
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agreed in the initial situation.2 14 Rawls imagines the parties in the
initial situation to be "mutually disinterested"; in other words, no
one in this position "has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss
for himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of
satisfaction."215  Moreover, "the only particular facts which the
parties [in the initial situation] know is that their society is subject
to the circumstances of justice... [i]t is taken for granted, however,
that they know the general facts about human society... [such as
those regarding] political affairs and the principles of economic
theory... [and] the basis of social organization and the laws of
human psychology."216  Rawls further sees race and sex
discrimination as irrational from the point of view of those in the
initial situation because they do not know what race or sex they
will be and therefore do not know whether they will "hold a
favored place in the social system which they [would be] willing to
exploit to their advantage." Furthermore, Rawls acknowledges
that contemporary societies are not just in the sense in which he
uses the term because the principles of justice are in substantial
dispute. Nonetheless, Rawls sees such societies as conforming
generally to some conception ofjustice.218
B. Why Rawls' Theory Should Not Be Applied to
Indian Tribes
1. Some General Observations about the Rawlsian Framework
That Suggest that It Is Peculiarly Applicable to Western
Societies
The application of Rawlsian social contract theory to a non-
Western society such as an Indian tribe, or to a multicultural
society such as our own, is problematic for several reasons. First,
Rawls' social contract theory is a Westernized white construct in
that it is only feasible for whites to believe that they can abstract







218 Id. at 5.
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themselves beyond race as is necessary to imagine oneself in the
initial situation. As Ian Haney L6pez has pointed out, the
identities of people of color tend to be inextricably linked to their
race or ethnicity.219 Thus, it is likely that only white Americans
have the ability to imagine what it would be like in the initial
situation. This suggests that an Indian, or another person from a
close-knit ethnic group, would not be able to abide by Rawls'
directive (i.e., that people imagine that they are not from whatever
ethnic group they belong to) to extrapolate what principles of
justice they would adopt. Indeed, people of color might well feel
that, without their ethnicity, they lack the necessary reference point
to make such a decision in the initial situation. This circumstance
suggests that the principles of justice propounded by Rawls are in
effect Western or white-although Rawls and fellow white readers
are unlikely to realize this fact. 2
Many of Rawls' presumptions about the initial situation
support the hypothesis that it primarily serves white, or at least
Western, interests. For example, he assumes that people in the
original position will be mutually disinterested, though he
acknowledges that a few of them may indeed be interested,
perhaps for religious reasons. 221 This assumption is clearly based
on the Western idea that happiness results from individual choice-
makin which helps to implement one's personal long-term
plan.22§ This assumption, however, probably does not apply to
those Indian tribes whose members are heavily interdependent for
survival. For example, it is difficult to imagine that the Netsa'ii
Gwich'in, who inhabit Venetie, a Native Village located in "one of
the harshest environments in the world,' 2 23 would adhere to Rawls'
219 See IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 157, 179 (1996).
220
See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996) (noting that "the characteristics
of the privileged group define the societal norm" and that white privilege
remains largely invisible to whites).
221
RAWLS, supra note 21, at 129, 142.222
Id at 92-93.
2M Brief of Alaska Federation of Natives et al., supra note 102, at part I.A.
(citations omitted).
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assumption that people in the initial situation would be mutually
disinterested if they were asked to imagine what the initial
situation might look like. A system of justice built on such an
assumption might ultimately result in the destruction of their entire
tribe. Moreover, many non-Western cultures do not value
individual choicemaking to the extent assumed in the Rawlsian
framework.224 Thus, assuming Rawls' theory is meant to facilitate
individual happiness to the greatest extent possible, it will be
useless to cultures with an entirely different conception of
happiness. Similarly, Rawls' assumption that a system of justice
should be built around a fair distribution of primary social goods-
such as income and wealth, opportunities, and rights and
liberties-in order to promote happiness (i.e., that people will want
the largest share of these goods possible) is a Western notion.225 If
the primary goal of Indian tribal members was to maximize their
individual access to goods, services, and power, they would
probably cease to be tribal members and instead assimilate into
white culture. Finally, Rawls' idea that aspects of society can be
dichotomized into those that secure equal liberty and those that
protect against economic and social inequality and his
prioritization of these principles are particularly Western-even
American. 226  As has been repeatedly pointed out in the
international human rights context, it is impossible to take
advantage of personal liberties without some minimum measure of
economic security.227 Only those who have become accustomed to
a certain level of luxury will fall to see this; in the United States,
this group is predominantly white.
224 Cf KYMLICKA, supra note 210, at 56-57 (describing communitarianism as
a philosophy that defines individuals' happiness according to the achievements
within their social roles but rejecting this philosophy for liberal reasons). See
also Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of
Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1340-41 (1993) (describing critiques of liberal
values which argue that they are peculiarly Western).
RAWLS, supra note 21, at 92.226 Id. at61.
227 See, e.g., FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 61 (2nd ed. 1996) (citations
omitted).
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These general observations about Rawls' social contract
theory suggest that it is less applicable, or not applicable at all, to
Indian tribes. To the extent that Indian tribes have a different
conception of happiness than mainstream American culture, have a
different value system, and value interdependence over
individualism, social contract theory-as currently construed-will
fail them. Additionally, these observations indicate that Rawls'
theory is problematic when applied to any pluralistic culture
because some members will not adhere to the underlying
assumptions of Rawls' theory.
2. Kymlicka's Criticisms of Rawls and His Assumption of
Homogeneity
In Liberalism, Community, and Culture, the philosopher
Will Kymlicka criticizes Rawls and liberalism for failing to give
proper weight to the primary good of cultural membership. 228 He
argues that liberalism and Rawls' social contract theory can and
should be modified to include cultural membership as a primary
social good. Kymlicka suggests that Rawls' theory implicitly
permits such a modification because it places a central importance
on individualized choicemaking and because cultural membership
provides the necessary context for such individualized
choicemaking.22 9  Additionally, Kymlicka sees the value of
cultural membership to be implicit in Rawls' emphasis on the
primary good of self-respect. 23  According to Kymlicka, Rawls
falls to recognize the importance of cultural membership because
he operates on the assumption that society is homogeneous. In a
homogeneous society, cultural membership would not need special
protection because no one's cultural membership would be in
jeopardy.23 '
Furthermore, Kymlicka believes that, under Rawls' view,
special protections for tribal culture would be justified (once
cultural membership was recognized as a primary good) because
228
See KYMLICKA, supra note 210, at 152, 164.
229
See id. at 164-66.
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"the very existence of aboriginal cultural communities is
vulnerable to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority around
them. 232 As a result of this condition, aboriginal peoples currently
"have to spend their resources on securing the cultural membership
which makes sense of their lives, something which non-aboriginal
people get for free." 233 Having this added expense in turn depletes
the resources which Indian tribal members can spend on pursuing
their individual life plans and thus reduces their potential to
achieve happiness.234  Finally, Kymlicka believes that it is not
appropriate for the mainstream culture to encourage or help
facilitate the assimilation of tribal members into white culture in
order to eliminate this expense because "cultural membership
seems crucial to personal agency and development: when the
individual is stripped of her cultural heritage, her development
becomes stunted. And so respecting people's own cultural
membership and facilitating their transition to another culture are
not equally legitimate options. 235
Kymlicka's critique of Rawls is useful because it has the
crucial benefit of justifying the protection of Indian tribes from
assimilation. Additionally, because it uses a liberal framework to
justify special rights for Indian tribes, Supreme Court Justices and
other members of the establishment are likely to perceive it as
more legitimate than many of the more radical critiques of Rawls'
theory. Another benefit is that it argues against the insistence that
Indian tribes retain their original customs as the price for their
236sovereignty. However, Kymlicka's focus on tribal members'








This trend was evident in Venetie, Kiowa Tribe, and Montana; in all three
cases the Court used the fact that the tribes' current customs and uses of their
sovereignty differed from their original customs and uses as an excuse to
abrogate tribal sovereignty. Kymlicka properly points out that such paternalistic
judgments violate social contract theory because they thwart tribal members'
choicemaking ability. See id. at 167.
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liberalism generally. 237  In focusing on individualized
choicemaking, Kymlicka leaves in place Rawls' adoption of a
Western conception of happiness and thereby does not object to the
Supreme Court's imposition of it onto tribal cultures.
Furthermore, this focus limits the extent to which Kymlicka's
theory may be used to promote self-determination. 2 38  As
Kymlicka suggests, once individualized choicemaking is
recognized as a primary good, tribal cultures may only be
protected to the extent that they facilitate and encourage individual
choicemaking; thus, such cultures may not then choose not to
accord primary weight to this value. If they do so, they violate the
individual's ability to freely chose and in turn forfeit their claim to
239protection. Moreover, according to Kymlicka, tribal cultures
may only temporarily prohibit individual choice when the culture
is in danger of disintegration. All other attempts to restrict
individualized choicemaking are forbidden and presumably justify
the federal government's withdrawal of special protections.
As a person who understands tribal culture and self-
determination to -be intrinsically valuable, I contend that
Kymlicka's view of tribal sovereignty, as embodied in Liberalism,
Community, and Culture, is inherently problematic. First,
Kymlicka's notion that tribal cultures are valuable only as contexts
for choicemaking is a Western construct; thus Kymlicka's view is
tantamount to saying that tribal culture is only valuable insofar as
237
But see Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition
of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PrTr. L. REV. 673, 673-74 (1985) (arguing that
modem liberals' emphasis on individual pursuit of happiness and their failure to
choose between different conceptions of the good is in fact contrary to
traditional liberalism); Richard Spaulding, Peoples as National Minorities: A
Review of Will Kymlicka's Arguments for Aboriginal Rights from a Self-
Determination Perspective, 47 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 35, 55-71 (1997) (arguing
that Kymlicka subsequently modified his view so that it is now less problematic
for Indian tribes).238
Cf Scott Cummings, Affirmative Action and the Rhetoric of Individual
Rights: Reclaiming Liberalism as a Color-Conscious Theory, 13 HARV.
BLACKLETrER J. 183, 216 (1997) (noting that Kymlicka "sacrifices the richness
of culture for an abstract commitment to freedom").239
KYMLICKA, supra note 210, at 170, 196.
240
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it serves Western purposes.241 Such a view can ultimately be used
to justify a considerable amount of monitoring of tribal cultures to
ensure that they are facilitating choicemaking, which in turn could
lead to forced assimilation. Furthermore, even if primary value is
placed on choicemaking, it is not clear that this concern justifies
interference with tribal cultures because tribal members remain
free to leave the reservation and join mainstream American society
should they find their personal philosophies more in accord with it.
Although such voluntary assimilation undoubtedly has its costs,
however, on the whole it seems less costly than deleterious
interference with the workings of tribal culture-except perhaps in
very extreme circumstances. Thus, although Kymlicka's theory is
useful in its attempt to justify governmental support for tribal
culture and in its defense of allowing tribes to rule their territories
without nonmember input, it fails to ameliorate concerns regarding
the imposition of Western values onto Indian tribes.
C. How Social Contract Theory is Being Misapplied by the
Court
As noted in part IV.A, the social contract requirement that
an individual consent to governmental power is purely
hypothetical. Actual consent is not necessary; the relevant
question is whether a rational individual would have consented.242
Moreover, Rawls has acknowledged that contemporary societies
are not just by his social contract standards. This is mainly
because the principles of justice are in dispute243 and because, as
discussed in part II.A.3, mainstream American society itself has
not lived up to the ideals of democratic justice in the past.
241
Patrick Macklein has pointed out that Kymlicka's view is also problematic
for Indian tribes because it incorporates tribes into the nation-state, when many
tribes see themselves as separate from the nation-state. Macklem, supra note
225, at 1354. Richard Spaulding argues that Kymlicka has since modified his
view so that it no longer presents this problem. Spaulding, supra note 238, at
55.
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The first way that the Supreme Court misapplies social
contract theory in its Indian law decisions is by looking for actual
consent by nonmembers. Such a search for actual consent was
evident in Strate, where the Court looked to the scope of the
contract to determine whether it could be read to include the tort
claim at issue.244 It is also evident-though to a lesser degree-in
the Stevens' dissent in Merrion,45 in Kiowa Tribe,246 in
Montana,247 in the Stevens plurality in Brendale,248 in Duro,249 and
in Oliphant.250  Indeed, every time the Supreme Court equates
tribal membership with consent, it is looking for an indication of
consent to be bound. Not only is this search for literal consent
impossible to square with social contract theory, on which the
Court implicitly relies, but such actual consent is a much more
stringent requirement than the Court is willing to impose on our
own state and federal governments in determining the reach of
their jurisdiction.25 1 It is unfair for the Court to enforce a more
stringent conception of Western justice on Indian tribes than it is
willing to enforce upon the rest of the nation.
Also present in the opinions discussed in part lI.A is the
idea that no rational nonmember would consent to tribal
government. We see this trend in cases where the Court notes the
extent to which nonmembers are present on the reservation, this
suggests that a trial convened by a tribal court would be alien to a
nonmember, or points out that tribes are not bound by all the Bill
of Rights protections.252 In these cases, the Supreme Court appears
to be making biased judgments about tribal governments based
upon racial stereotypes. For example, the court may be concluding
that because the tribal governments are run by non-whites, they
244 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997).
245 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).246 Kiowa Tribe, 1198 U.S. LEXIS 3406, at *13.
247
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.248
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 445.249
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679, 688 (1990).
250 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1978).
251
See Part II.A.3 supra.
252 Tribes are bound by most Bill of Rights protections under the Indian Civil
Rights Act. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-03 (West 1998).
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may not be fair or neutral; therefore, the Court seems to suggest
that it would be irrational to consent to tribal jurisdiction. The fact
that the Supreme Court does not feel constrained to consider these
issues when determining whether an alien can be tried in American
courts reinforces the conclusion that the Court is using a racist
double standard to evaluate tribal courts. While the question of the
rationality of hypothetical consent does accord with Rawlsian
social contract theory, Rawls' theory was meant to be used in
structuring a just society or in figuring out what justice entails. It
was not meant to be enforced as a law by a concededly unjust
society against much smaller, vulnerable cultures. Since it would
be irrational under Rawls' theory for any poor person or member
of a minority group to consent to our federal and state
governments, it is unfair to consider Indian tribes to be bound by
the rational consent requirement implicit in Rawls social contract
theory.2
53
Yet another problem with the Court's application of the
hypothetical consent requirement to tribal contexts is that the Court
never stops to consider whether Indian tribal members would have
rationally consented to the United States government. In fact, as
discussed earlier, the Court seems to adopt an irrebuttable
presumption that everyone (i.e., within the borders of the U.S., has
consented to government by the United States--despite its
253 This conclusion is based on both of Rawls' principles of justice, but more
so on the second one. Since poor people on welfare and people of color are
constantly expected to bear burdens in the United States that benefit those who
are better off (in the form of tax breaks or increased monopolization of jobs),
Rawls' second principle of justice is constantly violated in the United States by
both state and federal governments.
Rawls' first principle is also violated any time an individual is denied a
basic liberty such as the right to vote or serve on a jury. See Part.II.A.3 supra.
Such denials were commonplace in the United States in the past and some
remain so; since the Court has not traditionally viewed such denials of basic
liberties to divest state and federal courts of jurisdiction, it makes little sense to
view them as divesting Indian tribes of jurisdiction. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has occasionally upheld Equal Protection challenges based on racist
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from jury service, see, e.g., Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), it has never held that a state government or the
federal government lacked jurisdiction over an entire class of people because it
had systematically denied members of their group basic liberties.
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unfairness to minority groups. But suppose those in the initial
situation were asked to assume that they might turn out to be non-
mainstream members of a culture and subject to severe repression
and hostile or indifferent treatment by the culturally dominant
mainstream majority. Under Rawls' view, no rational person in
the initial situation would consent to such an outcome because of
the possibility that she would end up suffering the loss of a primary
good. This is why Rawls' statements that race and sex
discrimination are irrational and that no one in the initial situation
has reason to endure personal sacrifice so that others might
benefit.254 Thus, social contract theory should not be applied to
Indian tribes based upon the hypothetical rational consent it
mistakenly construes Indian tribes to have given. The Court errs in
its application of social contract theory to Indian tribes when it
takes the consent requirement literally and when it implicitly
concludes that it would be irrational for nonmembers to consent to
tribal jurisdiction. Finally, the Court's irrebuttable presumptions
that state and federal governments are per se just, and that tribal
governments are per se unjust are racist-especially in light of the
blatant injustices perpetrated by the United States government
against Indian tribes.
In sum, Rawlsian social contract theory should not be
applied to Indian tribes because it is a foreign construct to them, it
is based on assumptions that are not applicable to their situation,
and it is based upon the assumption of a homogeneous society.
Even if one remains unconvinced by these arguments, and
nonetheless would opt to apply social contract theory to Indian
tribes, it remains the case that the Supreme Court has erred in its
application of social contract theory to Indian tribes-i.e., it
imposes a double standard in its treatment of tribal and nontribal
governments.
V. THE COURT'S USE OF LIBERAL EQUALITY THEORY TO
DEBASE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
As we saw in Kiowa Tribe and Venetie, the Supreme Court
has begun to conceptualize Indian tribal sovereignty as an
254 RAWLS, supra note 21, at 13-14, 149.
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inherently suspect, race-based right, which will only be preserved
in the face of some sort of special justification. 25 5  Indeed, the
Court's emerging analysis of tribal sovereignty appears to be quite
similar to the strict scrutiny test the Supreme Court uses to
evaluate race-conscious legislation (e.g., affirmative action
programs). For example, in Venetie, the Court equated a sovereign
tribe with a racially-defined institution and expressed discomfort
with the tribe's continued ability to exercise sovereign powers
because of its racial character, in addition it held that only weak
and dependent tribes could take advantage of the special right of
sovereignty-at least where Congress has not unequivocally
expressed a contrary intent. This analysis mirrors the Equal
Protection analysis that the Supreme Court uses to evaluate
governmental affirmative action plans; in other words, it implicitly
incorporates the notion that tribal sovereignty is race-based and
therefore inherently suspect and the idea that tribal sovereignty is a
remedial measure which must be accorded only on a temporary
basis.2
56
Similarly, in Kiowa Tribe, the Supreme Court espoused the
view that sovereign immunity should only be accorded to weak
and defenseless tribes and that it should be revoked once an Indian
tribe has become sophisticated enough in business transactions to
no longer require protection from states. In conceiving of tribal
sovereign immunity in this manner, the Kiowa Tribe Court again
expressed a view of tribal sovereignty that is similar to its strict
scrutiny Equal Protection Clause analysis (i.e., in that it views
tribal sovereignty as a race-based right that is inherently suspect
255 Because tribal sovereignty is properly viewed as the rightful exercise of a
tribe's governmental power, but has been perverted by the Court into indicia of
its helplessness, I have called this trend the "debasement of tribal sovereignty."
By using the term "debasement," however, I do not mean to disparage
affirmative action programs which are of inestimable importance in their own
right. Instead, I wish only to point out that the Court has begun to treat tribal
sovereignty with the same disrespect it accords affirmative action programs.
256
See, e.g, Adarand Construction v. Pena, 515 U.S. 500 (1995); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See also United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that, in the private sector context,
affirmative action plans must be temporary measures).
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and therefore requires special justification-such as being
immediately necessary to protect an Indian tribe from extinction).
The race-based Equal Protection analysis on which the
Supreme Court has begun to draw in the Indian law context is
derived from an aspect of liberalism called formal equality theory.
Generally, as its applied in the constitutional realm, the doctrine is
called color-blind constitutionalism. 257 As some academics have
argued that formal equality theory is based on the idea that
"[r]acial groups are fungible. 255  As applied to the Equal
Protection Clause, formal equality theory:
does not formally acknowledge social groups, such
as blacks; nor does it offer any special dispensation
for conduct that benefits a disadvantaged group. It
only knows criteria or classifications; and the color
black is as much a racial criterion as the color
white. The regime it introduces is a symmetrical
one of "color blindness," making the criterion of
color, any color, presumptively impermissible.
259
Put simply, formal equality theory equates racial preferences for
subordinated groups with racist actions perpetrated by members of
the dominant group. Such analysis poses problems for
disadvantaged groups because, by abstracting race-based actions
from their relevant social context, it effectively prohibits the
preferential treatment that subordinated groups need to compete on
an equal basis with privileged whites.
2 60
Moreover, several commentators have pointed out that the
effect of liberal equality doctrine is to preserve the dominant norm
257
See Gotanda, supra note 117, at 262, 264; Fiss, supra note 117, at 126-29;
Cummings, supra note 239, at 190-91; Ann C. Scales, Emergence of Feminist
Jurisprudence: An Essay, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONs 40, 40
(D. Kelly Weisberg, ed., 1993). Collectively, I will refer to formal equality
theory, color-blind constitutionalism, and the Court's current Equal Protection
analysis as "liberal equality doctrine."
258 Gotanda, supra note 117, at 265.259
Fiss, supra note 117, at 129.260
See Gotanda, supra note 117, at 266, 268. See also Fiss, supra note 117, at
136.
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and leave the status quo unchallenged.261  This result occurs
because liberal equality doctrine views discrimination of any
cognizable type as a problem between individuals rather than as a
structural problem that requires a large-scale modification of
society262 and because society is currently organized according to
white racist constructs.263  An additional reason that liberal
equality theory has the effect of preserving the status quo is that it
only requires similar treatment of those who are similarly situated:
people in dissimilar circumstances need not be treated alike.264
Because liberal equality doctrine fails to challenge the underlying
norms of society, its end result for subordinated groups is
assimilation into the white male norm.2 65
As seen above, the Supreme Court's use of formal equality
theory and color-blind constitutionalism unfairly disadvantages
subordinated groups. In conceiving of racial preferences as the
moral and legal equivalents of state-enforced segregation, liberal
equality doctrine sanctions current social inequities and outlaws
most attempts to remedy them. Additionally, in abstracting
individuals from their relevant social context and from the
subordination or privilege they experience on a day-to-day basis,
liberal equality doctrine delegitimizes the experiences of people of
color and masks the existence of white privilege.266 Finally, the
application of this doctrine to subordinated groups is not only
unfair but also contrary to the purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause.267 Since race is socially constructed, a legal analysis of
261
See Gotanda, supra note 117, at 266, 271; Scales, supra note 258, at 60;
Cummings, supra note 239, at 237; HANEY F. LOPEZ, supra note 220, at 177.
262 See Gotanda, supra note 117, at 265. See also Scales, supra note 258, at 48;
Linda J. Krieger and Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 156, 166-67 (D. Kelly Weisberg, ed., 1993).
263 See Cummings, supra note 239, at 237.264
See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS 190, 195-202 (D. Kelly Weisberg, ed., 1993).
265 See Gotanda, supra note 117, at 269-71.266
See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 220, at 159-71, 179.267
See Fiss, supra note 117, at 136 (noting that "it would be one of the cruelest
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race-conscious action that is divorced from the social context in
which it occurred is illogical.
While the Supreme Court's approach to Equal Protection
analysis is problematic for all subordinated groups, it is especially
so for Indian tribes which were formerly protected from
assimilation by a fairly robust concept of tribal sovereignty. As the
Court comes to view tribal sovereignty as a possible violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, it sets in place the machinery of
assimilation. Without the governmental powers necessary to
perpetuate their own cultures, Indian tribes will not be able to resist
the pull of assimilation. Some other problems resulting from the
application of liberal equality doctrine to Indian tribes include its
focus on individual rather than collective rights 2 68 and the
requirement that Indians attempting to invoke the protection of
liberal equality theory be similarly situated to whites.2 69
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, there are
compelling reasons for not applying the doctrine to Indian tribes at
all-irrespective of whether it continues to be applied to other
groups. First, as mentioned earlier in this paper, Supreme Court
precedent itself maintains that tribes are not racial groups.270
Additionally, it has been argued that Indian tribes should be
understood as peoples under international law and therefore should
some tight, inextricable fashion-the judgments about the preferential and
exclusionary practices"). See also KYMLICKA, supra note 210, at 215 (arguing
that "[m]inority rights prevent rather than create threats to the state").
268 See, e.g., Vernon Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness: for Groups?, 69 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 607, 612 (June 1975).
269 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association, 485
U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect Indians
from having their sacred spaces damaged by the United States government
because the Clause only protects against governmental coercion of individuals).
Thus, in some sense, the reason that the Tribe in Lyng could not invoke the
protection of the Clause was because it was not similarly situated to whites with
respect to its religious practices.
270 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). But see Deloria and Newton,
supra note 11, at 72-73 (describing the Supreme Court's recent fixation on
whether Indians are a racial group as a "disturbing trend" and noting the
disastrous results the trend will likely have on Indians, many of whom do not
belong to any tribe and may be even less economically secure than those Indians
who can claim the benefits of tribal membership).
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be accorded the right to self-determination as a matter of
international law.271  This approach would render the Equal
Protection Clause inapplicable to Indian tribes altogether, making
tribes both eligible to receive special rights from the United States
government based on their status as peoples and free from the
constraints of liberal equality doctrine within their own borders.
272
Similarly, Patrick Macklem has argued that "[b]ecause
tribal governments do not derive their authority from federal or
state sources, their actions need not conform to constitutional
constraints on federal and state authority., 273 In other words, the
facts that tribes were present on the North American continent
before the establishment of the United States and that they retain
some of their preexisting sovereign powers make them exempt
from the Equal Protection Clause and other limitations emanating
from United States' governmental power.274 Lastly, others have
argued that Indian tribes' prior occupancy, standing alone, justifies
their continued exercise of sovereign power and their exemption
from federal constitutional requirements.275
Whether one focuses on the illegitimacy of liberal equality
doctrine or on its inapplicability to Indian tribes, it is clear that the
Supreme Court's increasing reliance on liberal equality doctrine in
abrogating tribal sovereignty is dangerous to tribal sovereignty and
integrity. The continued application of this doctrine to tribal
sovereignty issues will lead to the complete abrogation of tribal
sovereignty by the Court, in contravention of Congress' announced
self-determination goals for tribal governments. Involuntary
assimilation into white culture will inevitably follow such a
wholesale abrogation of tribal sovereignty.
Forced assimilation has been implemented before with
disastrous results. As Gotanda points out, it is another form of
271
See David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause:








See id. at 1327-28 (discussing the prior-occupancy justification as employed
by other commentators).
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cultural genocide. 276 As such, members of a democracy should be
vehemently opposed to it. Furthermore, the U.S. has an obligation
to treat Indian tribes-and its peoples-with respect and to stop
repeating its previous misguided policies with Indian tribes. After
all, if one closely examines United States history, she will find that
the federal government-with the help of many of its citizen's-
invaded Indian Country, only to ruthlessly massacre Indians, steal
their land, and then try to assimilate them into a radically foreign
culture. While Congress has taken steps towards reconciling past
wrongs and charting a new course, the activist Court seems
determined to eradicate the progress made in this area. In sum, the
Court has begun a behind-the-scenes debasement of tribal
sovereignty. Its debasement is based on a highly questionably
conflation of Indian racial status with that of other minority
groups. Moreover, liberal equality theory has merely become a
tool for prolonging the oppression of subordinated groups, and
therefore, should be abandoned or significantly modified.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the passed two decades, the Supreme Court has
increasingly divested tribal sovereignty on its own initiative.
Recently, the Court has begun debasing tribal sovereignty by
construing it as an inherently suspect, race-based entitlement.
These trends have been implemented by unusually pernicious
means, including selectively ignoring the Indian law canons of
construction and construing statutes without reference to
subsequent legislative history and changes in legislative policy.
Both trends can be traced, in part, to liberal doctrines of
questionable applicability in the Indian law context. More
specifically, the divestment of tribal sovereignty can be traced, in
large part, to the Court's reliance on social contract theory to
justify governmental exercises of authority. The debasement of
tribal sovereignty can be traced to the Court's espousal of liberal
equality doctrine. However, these doctrines have no place in
Indian law. Lastly, these doctrines are of dubious legitimacy even
outside of the Indian law context, because of the significant
276
Gotanda, supra note 117, at 270-71.
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problems in their application to any subordinated group or
multicultural society. They should be forsaken by the Supreme
Court.

